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DERIVATIVE WORKS 2.0: RECONSIDERING
TRANSFORMATIVE USE IN THE AGE OF
CROWDSOURCED CREATION
Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian
ABSTRACT—Apple invites us to “Rip. Mix. Burn.” while Sony exhorts us
to “make.believe.” Digital service providers enable us to create new forms
of derivative work—work based substantially on one or more preexisting
works. But can we, in a carefree and creative spirit, remix music, movies,
and television shows without fear of copyright infringement liability?
Despite the exponential growth of remixing technologies, content holders
continue to benefit from the vagaries of copyright law. There are no clear
principles to determine whether any given remix will infringe one or more
copyrights. Thus, rights holders can easily and plausibly threaten
infringement suits and potentially chill much creative activity. This Article
examines the impact of copyright doctrine on remixes with an emphasis on
crowdsourced projects. Such an analysis is particularly salient at this
juncture because consumers are neither as passive nor as isolated as they
once were. Specifically, large-scale crowdsourced projects raise issues
relating to copyright and fair use on a scope and scale never before
imaginable. As such, this Article reflects on the particular problems raised
by the growth of crowdsourced projects and how our copyright regime can
best address them. We conclude that future legal developments will require
a thoughtful and sophisticated balance to facilitate free speech, artistic
expression, and commercial profit. To this end, we suggest a number of
options for legal reform, including: (1) reworking the strict liability basis of
copyright infringement for noncommercial works, (2) tempering damages
awards for noncommercial or innocent infringement, (3) creating an
“intermediate liability” regime that gives courts a middle ground between
infringement and fair use, (4) developing clearer ex ante guidelines for fair
use, and (5) reworking the statutory definition of “derivative work” to
exclude noncommercial remixing activities.
AUTHORS—Jacqueline D. Lipton, Baker Botts Professor of Law and CoDirector, Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law,
University of Houston. John Tehranian, Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of
Law, Southwestern Law School and the Biederman Entertainment and
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of derivative works in copyright law is inherently
problematic. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act secures for copyright
holders the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work.”1 The Act then defines a derivative work as any “work
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”2 Thus, the very
statutory definition of what constitutes a derivative work seems to
reserve—to the copyright holder—the exclusive right to “transform” an
original work.
At the same time, however, a related section of the federal copyright
regime says something entirely different. The fair use doctrine, codified in
§ 107 of the Act, involves a four-part balancing test. Courts have read the
first factor—“the purpose and character of the use”3—to consider whether a
1
2
3

17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
Id. § 107.
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particular use is transformative in nature.4 The more transformative the use,
the more likely a court is to absolve a defendant from infringement
liability. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use
doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright . . . .”5
Thus, on one hand, copyright’s derivative works doctrine seems to
grant the exclusive right to engage in transformative use of a work to that
work’s copyright holder. On the other hand, the fair use doctrine seems to
suggest that transformative uses of works are precisely the types of works
that copyright law should immunize from infringement liability. In short,
copyright law sends us mixed messages. This Article analyzes the impact
of this inherent tension within the Copyright Act on the practice of creative
remixing, with a view toward suggesting legal reforms to attenuate some of
the extant ambiguities in the law. The discussion is particularly timely in
light of the House Judiciary Committee’s announcement in April 2013 of
its plans to conduct a comprehensive review of American copyright law6—
a review that is active and ongoing.7
4

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Castle Rock Entm’t,
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1998).
5
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
6
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Chairman Goodlatte Announces
Comprehensive Review of Copyright Law (Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
index.cfm/2013/4/chairmangoodlatteannouncescomprehensivereviewofcopyrightlaw [http://perma.cc/
PUL5-XZ4K].
7
The Judiciary Committee continues to review a wide variety of copyright-related issues, including
the scope of fair use, copyright remedies, music licensing, moral rights, termination rights, resale
royalties, and copyright duration. See, e.g., Hearing on Copyright Remedies Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014);
Hearing on Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, & Copyright Term Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014);
Hearing on Music Licensing Under Title 17 Part I & II Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014); Hearing on the Scope of
Fair Use Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014). Recent high-profile copyright disputes appear to have only increased the
Committee’s resolve to conduct a broad reexamination of copyright law. For example, in response to
the recent Supreme Court decision in the Aereo case, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob
Goodlatte stated:
Today’s Supreme Court decision reinforces the importance of the House Judiciary Committee’s
ongoing review of our copyright law. The review is essential in determining whether the laws are
still working in the digital age. It is my hope that we can identify improvements to our copyright
laws that can benefit both the content community and the technology community, as well as
consumers, by maintaining strong protections for copyrighted works and strong incentives for
further innovation.
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte Statement on Supreme Court
Decision in Aereo Case (June 25, 2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
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Not surprisingly, an examination of the history and evolution of
copyright law sheds some light on this apparent internal contradiction in
the scope of protection given to derivative works. Long ago, copyright was
a law against piracy. The concept of infringement was limited to direct,
one-to-one unauthorized reproductions of books, charts, and maps.8 But
times have changed: today, the law of copyright does not merely protect an
author against the scourge of pirated product. It secures the ability of rights
holders to control entire derivative franchises that span multiple sectors of
the economy and categories of consumption.9 Harry Potter is not merely a
book series: it is a movie franchise, a bankable toy line, musical recordings,
video and board games, mobile apps, Halloween costumes, branded
clothing, jewelry, home decor, fashion accessories, kitchenware, and even a
bedding line.10 And it is a singular feature of modern copyright law, the
derivative rights doctrine, that allows Harry Potter’s author, J.K. Rowling,
and her licensee, Warner Brothers, the exclusive ability to control this
universe.
Derivative rights are, no doubt, a boon to rights holders. Yet they may
also serve public policy by incentivizing the creation of certain types of
works that may not otherwise be made. For example, they enable studios to
invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the financing of a movie because,
if successful, it will spur the creation of sequels, spin-off television series,
and toy and clothing lines.11 But there is also a dark side to the derivative
rights doctrine. As digital technology and the tools of networked creativity
have dispersed into the hands of ordinary people on an unprecedented
scale, we are increasingly forced to confront this conundrum: At a time
when individuals have a greater ability to make transformative use of
creative works than ever before, the law is sharply limiting their ability to
do so. If we wanted to make a remix of our favorite moments from the
Harry Potter movies, could we do it without infringing copyright? What if
we wanted to invite our friends to contribute their favorite scenes? And, if
we wanted to post the resulting video mash-up on YouTube, would it make
any difference if we accompanied the post with a notice asserting that the
remix was fair use or that no infringement was intended?

index.cfm/2014/6/goodlatte-statement-on-supreme-court-decision-in-aereo-case [http://perma.cc/BEU7G7GA].
8
See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (limiting infringement claims to the
unauthorized printing, reprinting, publishing, or vending of a copyrighted book, chart, or map).
9
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”).
10
See Harry Potter, WBSHOP.COM, http://www.wbshop.com/category/wbshop_brands/harry
+potter.do?nType=2 [http://perma.cc/977J-A7JB].
11
This is a direct product of the exclusive right copyright holders enjoy to control the marketplace
for any derivative works based on the original movie. See § 106(2).
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As the law currently stands, if we do not obtain permission from the
copyright holder (Warner Brothers in this case), the only way to ascertain
whether our actions are infringing is to wait and see if Warner Brothers
sues and then attempt to establish a successful fair use defense.12
Unfortunately, the contradiction between the broad scope of the derivative
rights doctrine, which seems to interdict all unauthorized transformative
uses, and the first factor of the fair use defense, which strongly favors
immunizing unauthorized but transformative uses from infringement
liability, creates a state of affairs wrought with ambiguity. One can always
litigate the question for a definitive answer, but litigation is timeconsuming and expensive. Moreover, under existing law, there is a good
chance we would lose the suit and suffer backbreaking penalties.13 And
even if we could afford litigation, assert the fair use defense, and win in the
trial court, Warner Brothers would continue to appeal to higher courts
where we might ultimately lose—or even win, but at staggering costs that
create substantial chilling effects on remix-related activities.
Given these risks, we may simply remove our work from YouTube or
refrain from complaining if Warner Brothers convinces YouTube to do
so.14 More worryingly, we may decide not to make—or at least not to
post—the remix in the first place. Thus, despite its goal of fostering
innovation,15 copyright law may be chilling a significant volume of
harmless, and potentially beneficial, creative activity. There is no way of
empirically measuring any such chilling effect; it is impossible to know
how many works are neither created nor disseminated because of concerns
about copyright infringement. But examples of the law’s chilling effect on
remix culture abound.16
12

See id. § 107 (fair use defense to copyright infringement).
See id. § 504 (granting remedies in the form of statutory damages of up to $150,000 per act of
willful infringement or, in the alternative, actual damages and a disgorgement of profits); id. § 505
(granting courts the discretion to award costs and attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in copyright
infringement suits).
14
Under the “notice and takedown” mechanism in the Copyright Act, this is a simple process for
copyright holders. See id. § 512.
15
See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (5th ed. 2010) (“On
the one hand, copyright law provides the incentive to create information and a shelter to develop and
protect it. On the other hand, the copyright monopoly is a limited one—limited in time and scope by
such doctrines as idea/expression, originality, and fair use. Viewed in this way, copyright law represents
an economic tradeoff between encouraging the optimal creation of works of authorship through
monopoly incentives, and providing for their optimal access, use, and distribution through limiting
doctrines.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Comment, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 684 (1997) (“Copyright’s purpose . . . is to encourage creativity
for the public interest, not only to ensure monopoly profits . . . .”).
16
See, e,g., JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
61–62 (2011) (“There’s a lot of fun in sampling, and the sampling that we did do was a lot of fun and
sparked a lot of creativity, but I think now it’s a little bit prohibitive to sample. It’s just so damn
13
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Although one may argue that Harry Potter remixes and other such
unauthorized uses of preexisting copyrighted materials are unimportant and
contribute little to public discourse, we argue that there is significant value
in encouraging this kind of creativity.17 Such transformative activities as
remix, sampling, mash-ups, appropriationist art, parody, and satire advance
progress in the arts by criticizing or illuminating our values, assessing our
social institutions, and commenting on current events and our culture.18 A
broad reading of the exclusive right of copyright holders to prepare
derivative works threatens to enervate our creative marketplace. Remixes
of popular works enable consumers to play with new technologies and to
learn to use those technologies to express themselves. They are also a form
of communication between consumers on a global level. Where remixes are
crowdsourced, they enable people to benefit from creative interactions in
developing new works. Finally, the output of these efforts provides an
important benefit by publicizing new works of art imbued with original
meanings, messages, and expressions.
While we do not advocate breaking or ignoring the law, we do suggest
that insufficient attention has been paid in copyright discourse to the
important social benefits inhering in creative remixing activities. The
problem for fans of popular works is that copyright law, including the fair
expensive, and it’s such a hassle trying to clear things. As far as sampling goes, it’s an interesting area
these days, because it’s definitely been dying out. It hasn’t been arranged in a way where it’s workable
for musicians to do it.” (quoting Beck as identifying the substantial impact of the law on his creative
decisionmaking and why his more recent albums, like Guero, have relied less extensively on
sampling)); 2 BATTLEGROUND: THE MEDIA 347 (Robin Andersen & Jonathan Gray eds., 2008) (“Public
Enemy pulled the track ‘Psycho of Greed’ from their 2002 album Revolverlution because of the
exorbitant fee for using a sample from the Beatles’ ‘Tomorrow Never Knows.’”); Kembrew McLeod,
How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank
Shocklee, STAY FREE! MAG., Fall 2002, http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/
public_enemy.html [http://perma.cc/MG5L-M7YR] (documenting how copyright litigation over
sampling has caused hip–hop groups to change their production style and limit the number of samples
they use); Julia Halperin, Is Prince v. Cariou Already Having a Chilling Effect? Contemporary Artists
Speak, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Jan. 2, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/758352/isprince-v-cariou-already-having-a-chilling-effect [http://perma.cc/MD9F-29NM] (discussing the chilling
effects on appropriationist art stemming from the lower court decision in Prince v. Cariou, 784 F. Supp.
2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013)); Benjamin
Jackson, Why Remix Culture Needs New Copyright Laws, BUZZFEED (Oct. 24, 2012, 3:32 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/benjaminj4/why-remix-culture-needs-new-copyright-laws [http://perma.cc/
969J-6U76] (noting the impact of copyright law on the commercialization of creative works containing
samples).
17
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 77 (2008) (noting that engaging in remixing activities is valuable even if the actual content
produced by the remixes is not).
18
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 684 (“People should be able to participate actively in the creative
aspects of the world around them. When most creative output is controlled by large corporations,
freedom to modify and elaborate on existing characters is necessary to preserve a participatory element
in popular culture.” (footnote omitted)).

388

109:383 (2015)

Derivative Works 2.0

use defense, is currently too vague and flexible in operation to provide
necessary guidance to remixers about the legality of their activities.19
Because remixes of articles of popular culture are socially beneficial and do
little commercial harm to copyright holders, we argue that lawmakers
should provide clearer guidelines to protect remixing activities. In many
instances, the social benefits of creative remixes can outweigh the harm to
copyright holders. As such, copyright law should more clearly reflect this
possibility.
Part I discusses the social benefits inherent in remixing activities, with
a particular focus on crowdsourced remixes. Crowdsourced projects are
creative enterprises where individuals (often strangers) scattered across the
globe work on editing, revising, adding to, and subtracting from creative
works in an iterative process.20 They are the new wave of consumer
creativity online, and little has been written on the application of copyright
doctrine to these activities. We intend to contribute to this debate by
addressing ways in which crowdsourced projects differ from individual
consumer remixes, and identifying specific problems created for
crowdsourced projects by the vagaries of copyright law. While our
discussion covers both individual and crowdsourced remixing projects, we
aim to emphasize the differences between the two. In particular, large-scale
crowdsourced works may have more commercial potential than short
individual fan mash-ups. The greater potential to commercialize a largescale project might be perceived as a threat to copyright holders, and this
could impact how the fair use defense is applied. The fair use defense
requires a court to conduct a significant examination of the extent to which
a defendant’s work potentially impacts the value or market for the
plaintiff’s protected material,21 so the differences between individual and
crowdsourced remixing projects can bear heavily on the effectiveness of
the fair use defense.
Part II introduces relevant aspects of copyright law, focusing on ways
in which artistic crowdsourced projects may infringe copyright and whether
defenses such as fair use might excuse infringement. Again, we will
contrast more traditional fan mash-ups with larger-scale crowdsourced
projects. This Part concludes with a case study of the recent Star Wars:
Uncut film as an unauthorized crowdsourced fan remix of a Star Wars
movie. The case study demonstrates the ways in which large-scale creative

19

Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire
Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (discussing this issue in relation to video mash-ups
involving popular movies).
20
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
21
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).

389

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

products that draw significantly on existing copyrighted works pose
particular problems for copyright law.
Part III draws together the issues raised in Part II by discussing new
challenges for copyright law and the fair use doctrine in particular. We
advocate the development of new copyright policies that better account for
the advent and value of large-scale remixing activities. Part IV concludes
with a summary of the challenges for copyright law in the age of digital
remixing, and with suggested directions for future legal developments to
address the challenges posed by crowdsourcing and remixing.
I.

REMIXING AND CROWDSOURCING

A. Risk and Reward in Remixing: The Recent History22
We begin our analysis by looking at the recent history of remixing,
including its treatment under the law and its impact on the arts and artists.
The practice of remixing has come under direct fire since the first reported
decision to consider the legality of sampling resulted in substantial liability
for rapper Biz Markie in 1991.23 Sampling is the practice of taking portions
of a preexisting recording and integrating them into a recording featuring
other music and lyrics in order to form a new song.24 The permissibility of
sampling speaks directly to the broader issue of whether making pastiche
uses of underlying materials to create new finished products—as in the case
of remixing—is legal. Until the early 1990s, no court had considered
whether such uses—only recently made possible with the advent of
splicing technologies, and quickly popularized in hip–hop—constituted
infringement or fair use.25 In Grand Upright Music, Markie famously faced
infringement allegations for using a piano riff from Gilbert O’Sullivan’s
“Alone Again (Naturally)” without authorization or payment.26 In a
decision that betrayed the legal intricacies and novelty of the issue, the
judge quoted Exodus and sophistically equated the Seventh Commandment

22

Portions of Part I.A come from Derek Khanna & John Tehranian, Comment Regarding
Reforming Statutory Damages for Transformative Uses, Response to the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration Request for Comments on Department of Commerce Green Paper on
Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, Docket No. 130927852-3852-01
(Nov. 11, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/khanna_-_tehranian_comments.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KHG8-4FDB].
23
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
24
For example, the Oxford Dictionary defines “sampling” (in this context) as “[t]he technique of
digitally encoding music or sound and reusing it as part of a composition or recording.” Sampling,
OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sampling
?q=sampling [http://perma.cc/5QUP-YB8S].
25
See Khanna & Tehranian, supra note 22, at 3.
26
Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 183.
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with the law of copyright by concluding, “Thou shalt not steal.”27 By
conflating copyright infringement with theft of a biblical proportion and
imposing the attendant moral and ethical culpability that follows, the court
failed to acknowledge the nuanced artistic and economic stakes in the
sampling debate. The result of the decision was not just the issuance of an
injunction against Markie; the case also triggered Markie’s referral to the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for potential
prosecution under criminal copyright laws.28 More recently, in Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, a federal appellate court held that any
unauthorized sample of a sound recording, no matter how small,
constituted copyright infringement: “Get a license or do not sample.”29
Such an absolute position not only ignores the existence of the fair use
doctrine, but also fails to account for the competing private and social
interests involved in the act of sampling.
To be fair, not all courts have found liability against unauthorized
samplers.30 But many have, making it difficult for artists to predict the
likely outcome of a fair use defense. To avoid any specter of liability,
record labels have pushed artists to be incredibly conservative in their
practices, to the point where labels often will not release records with
unlicensed samples even if a legitimate fair use argument exists. William
Patry, author of one of the leading treatises on copyright law, explains the
problematic consequences of current law:
The result of [the Bridgeport Music court’s] terrible decision has been an
unwillingness of record companies to put out albums unless each and every
sample is cleared. Producers of records must certify that all samples have been
licensed . . . . Since previous hip-hop albums used hundreds (and sometimes
thousands) of samples, licensing that number of samples is out of the question
due to financial and transactional cost reasons. As a result, the creative
process of hip-hop has changed.31

Take the case of Paul’s Boutique by the Beastie Boys, which came out
in 1989 and is considered one of the most influential and innovative hip–

27

Id.
Id. at 185.
29
410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
30
See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (excusing unauthorized sample by
the Beastie Boys of underlying musical composition on the grounds that the use was de minimis,
particularly in light of the fact that the Beastie Boys had obtained a license for use of the sound
recording containing the musical composition); VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO
(CWx), 2013 WL 8600435, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (finding that use of a percussive “horn hit”
in Madonna’s Vogue, even if sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection, amounted to
nonactionable de minimis use).
31
WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 93 (2011) (footnote omitted).
28
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hop albums of all time.32 It featured more than 100 samples, some of them
unlicensed.33 This level of sampling led to a unique final product. As Mike
Simpson, who produced the album, has explained, “[W]hat we were doing
was making entire songs out of samples taken from various different
sources. On Paul’s Boutique everything was a collage.”34 Today, Simpson
notes, clearing all necessary samples would be “unthinkable.”35 Indeed, law
professor Jason Mazzone estimates that the current cost of obtaining
clearances, along with finding and tracking down every single artist, would
amount to over $3 million.36 Paul’s Boutique could never be affordably
created under the existing legal regime.
Innovators inevitably stand on the shoulders of those who came before
them, and laws that restrict the inherently iterative process of creation
ultimately harm the robustness of the arts. Consider Public Enemy’s “Don’t
Believe the Hype” from 1988, a work that would have been economically
prohibitive to produce in the wake of recent case law on sampling. The
song builds on the work of at least seven different preexisting sound
recordings, including James Brown, whose songs are sampled throughout
the track.37 But Public Enemy was not merely taking. It was giving, too—
and not just to fans of rap and hip–hop; “Don’t Believe the Hype” has itself
been sampled by at least sixty-six other songs.38 Many prominent artists,
from the expected (The Game, N.W.A., and The Roots) to the unexpected
(U2, Weezer, and the unforgettable Milli Vanilli), have used the track to
create their own works.39
Remixing and sampling are therefore not merely the pastime of a few
college students residing in dorms and tinkering with their turntables.
Instead, these practices form the cohesive tissue that connects music and
people through a shared culture. They are part of a rich, referential
methodology that has long fueled innovation in all forms of content
creation. Long before remixing and sampling ever became viable, writer
32
Tom Mann, How Beastie Boys ‘Paul’s Boutique’ Changed Everything, FASTERLOUDER (Feb. 12,
2014),
http://www.fasterlouder.com.au/features/38414/How-Beastie-Boys-Pauls-Boutique-changedeverything [http://perma.cc/CCC9-LBR8].
33
Jason Mazzone, The Day the Music Died, BLSLAWNOTES, Fall 2011, at 28–29,
http://www.brooklaw.edu/~/media/PDF/Admissions/49196BLS_LawNotes.ashx [http://perma.cc/9ZT4VKLP]; Paul Tingen, The Dust Brothers: Sampling, Remixing & The Boat Studio, SOUND ON SOUND
(May 2005), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/may05/articles/dust.htm [http://perma.cc/BWP2QPX7].
34
Tingen, supra note 33.
35
Id.
36
Mazzone, supra note 33, at 30.
37
Don’t Believe the Hype, WHOSAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/Public-Enemy/Don%27tBelieve-the-Hype/ [http://perma.cc/NWM2-B4DX].
38
Id.
39
Id.
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Donald Barthelme highlighted the power of mash-ups, juxtapositions, and
appropriation. The ultimate tool of the genius, he wrote, is rubber cement.40
Yet the law is taking the tool of rubber cement—the very stuff that enables
artistic pastiche and the repurposing and reconstructing of creative
content—out of the hands of musicians and other artists.
When viewed in both comparative and historical contexts, the inability
of modern creators to make use of the raw materials of their musical,
literary, and artistic progenitors is nothing short of striking. Warhol could
draw on the iconography of Marilyn, Mao, Marlon, and Muhammad.41
Elvis Presley and the members of Led Zeppelin could riff on the rhythm
and blues of their youth.42 Marcel Duchamp could take Da Vinci’s Mona
Lisa and turn her into the mustachioed subject of ribald word play
(L.H.O.O.Q.).43 And, luckily, courts have not yet taken away the ability of
writers to quote the words of others. Yet the rulings on digital sampling
have effectively foreclosed the ability to reference and transform other
music at all. The current case law on remixing and sampling impedes the
development of electronic dance music, the work of mash-up artists, and
innovation in virtually every genre of modern music and every facet of
contemporary art.
B. Remixing and Crowdsourcing 101
Despite the value of sampling and other forms of remixing to artists
and the public alike, the practice has come under significant legal pressure
in recent years. The law’s impact on the development of the arts and on
expressive activities is growing even more pronounced as modern
networked technologies have enabled new forms of remixing to take place
through the process of crowdsourcing. To better understand the stakes, it
behooves us to examine the relationship between remixing and
40

DONALD BARTHELME, The Genius, in SADNESS 23, 26 (1972).
See, e.g., Andy Warhol Biography, WARHOL, http://www.warhol.org/collection/aboutandy/
biography/ [http://perma.cc/69YS-5RNX]; Andy Warhol, Muhammad Ali, 1978, synthetic polymer and
silkscreen inks on canvas, 101.6cm x 101.6cm; Andy Warhol, Marlon, 1966, silkscreen ink on canvas,
104.2cm x 117.1cm.
42
Of course, such unauthorized riffing, and the subsequent economic success that came from it
despite the absence of permission from or payment to the individuals whose works “inspired” Led
Zeppelin, Presley, and others, is not without serious racial implications. See, e.g., Keith Aoki,
Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 762–65 (2007) (discussing efforts of the Estate
of Willie Dixon, an African-American blues musician, to litigate successfully against Led Zeppelin for
its uncredited, unauthorized, and uncompensated lifting of “You Need Love” for its song, “Whole Lotta
Love”); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American
Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1193 (2008) (“The fleecing of Black artists was the
basis of the success of the American music industry . . . .”).
43
Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q., 1919, pencil on reproduction of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa,
19.7cm x 12.4cm.
41
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crowdsourcing, and the particular legal claims at issue in this brave new
world of interactive and iterative audience-driven creation.
Remixing and crowdsourcing are related, but distinct, concepts. Only
in recent years have crowdsourced remixes begun to gain prominence in
online culture. A remix is best described as a form of “collage” that uses
text, audio, video, or some combination thereof.44 As Professor Lawrence
Lessig notes, new digital technologies enable anyone to create new content
using existing text, music, or video45 to share in this form of creativity.46
The resulting creative works can serve as sophisticated commentary, pure
entertainment, or simple and unadulterated self-expression.47
Though the term “remix” has largely been used in the context of
digital culture in recent years, music remixes predate this technology by
many years and involve similar concepts of joining together different
musical elements to create a new work or new version of an existing work.
Rap music is an obvious example of a musical form where different layers
or sources are often piled together in a kind of collage.48 On Paul’s
Boutique, for example, the Beastie Boys interweave at least seventeen
samples of preexisting works over the lyrics and music of “Hey Ladies,” a
three-minute song.49 Often a preexisting work is borrowed and used to
create a new message.50
Creative remixes are remixes whether or not they utilize new
technologies, and they are often thought of as individual or small group

44

LESSIG, supra note 17, at 70–71 (comparing physical collage with digital collage). Professor
Lessig has also described remixing as quoting a wide range of texts to produce something new. Id. at 69
(“[Read/write media] remix, or quote, a wide range of ‘texts’ to produce something new. These
quotes . . . happen in different layers. Unlike text, where the quotes follow in a single line[,] . . .
remixed media may quote sounds over images, or video over text, or text over sounds. The quotes thus
get mixed together. The mix produces the new creative work—the ‘remix.’”).
45
Id. at 69 (“Using the tools of digital technology—even the simplest tools, bundled into the most
innovative modern operating systems—anyone can begin to ‘write’ using images, or music, or video.”).
46
Id. (“[U]sing the facilities of a free digital network, anyone can share that writing with anyone
else.”).
47
Id. at 71–74 (giving examples of remixes for various different purposes).
48
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 315 (discussing “sampling” from various musical sources when
creating rap and hip–hop music).
49
Tingen, supra note 33 (“On Paul’s Boutique everything was a collage. There was one track on
which the Beastie Boys played some instruments, but apart from that everything was made of
samples.”); Hey Ladies, WHOSAMPLED, http://www.whosampled.com/Beastie-Boys/Hey-Ladies/
[http://perma.cc/LBH9-RVMY].
50
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (finding 2 Live Crew’s
hip–hop parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” transformative and entitled to the fair use defense
because, inter alia, “2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true,
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility” and
because “[t]he later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies”).
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projects.51 Crowdsourcing, on the other hand, has quickly blossomed with
the birth and evolution of digital communications media and networked
technologies, and crowdsourced work is typically defined by the artistry of
numerous contributors. Wikipedia—perhaps the world’s most successful
crowdsourced work52—defines crowdsourcing as “the process of obtaining
needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large
group of people, and especially from an online community, rather than
from traditional employees or suppliers.”53 Although crowdsourcing is not
new to the Internet age,54 interactive Web 2.0 technologies55 enable
crowdsourced projects of a scope and on a scale never before possible.56
Much early digital crowdsourcing was more scientific or functional than
artistically creative. For example, although it technically constitutes a
literary work,57 Wikipedia is fundamentally a contribution to general
knowledge in a variety of areas of human interest. Recent Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI)58 projects59 invoked crowdsourcing to
gather and share data involving the search for intelligent life outside the
Earth environment.60 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has used crowdsourcing to map the surfaces of extraterritorial
bodies.61
51

LESSIG, supra note 17, at 71–74 (giving examples of remixes that happen to have been created
by individuals).
52
Wikipedia describes itself as a “free-access, free content Internet encyclopedia” that allows
“[a]lmost anyone who can access the site [to] edit almost any of its articles.” See Wikipedia,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia [http://perma.cc/4HXL-DXZA] (footnote omitted).
53
See Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing [http://perma.cc/
L8SP-PTHU].
54
See, e.g., SIMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN 101–14 (1998) (describing
the way in which the original Oxford English Dictionary was created via crowdsourcing).
55
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 27 (describing “Web 2.0” as “the current jargon commonly
associated with interactive information sharing, interoperability, and user centered design”).
56
Id. (“[T]oday’s web, with its rich user generated material, metadata, and dynamic content, allows
users to do more than retrieve information and it promotes innovative ways to both create, exploit, and
preserve copyrighted works.” (footnote omitted)).
57
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which
they are embodied.”).
58
SEARCH FOR EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCE INST., http://www.seti.org/ [http://perma.
cc/K5GS-QZ92].
59
SETIQUEST, http://setiquest.org/about [http://perma.cc/SSX-79LH] (“[S]etiQuest is a community
involvement that will lead to a significant improvement in our ability to search for other intelligent
civilizations in the cosmos, and in the process, to use SETI to change the world.”).
60
Jane Wakefield, SETI Live Website to Crowdsource Alien Life, BBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2012,
7:24 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-17199882 [http://perma.cc/XX82-FNY3].
61
NASA and Planetary Resources Sign Agreement to Crowdsource Asteroid Detection, NASA
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nasa.gov/content/nasa-and-planetary-resources-sign-agreement-to-crowd
source-asteroid-detection/#.UsGKV7R0lH0 [http://perma.cc/GRD8-ZA7Y].
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However, some crowdsourced projects are more creative and artistic
than functional. For example, a virtual world like Second Life62 is
effectively a crowdsourced project. Individuals from around the globe
contribute the characters and environments of these virtual worlds. People
create avatars63 and participate in these virtual communities to fulfill
expressive and creative, rather than scientific or functional, goals. Virtual
worlds involve both artistic development (in the designing of elements of
the virtual milieu) and social interaction (in the communications between
participants). They promote very different values from the Wikipedia,
NASA, and SETI projects. They are not about gathering, collating, and
disseminating information. Rather, they foster self-expression, creativity,
and individual autonomy.
While it is possible to crowdsource a remix, not all crowdsourced
projects will be creative remixes of existing works. Many involve
technological or scientific advances, and many revolve around the creation
and development of new data or information, rather than remixing existing
works.64 The Harry Potter remix described in the Introduction is intended
as a paradigmatic example of a creative crowdsourced remix.65 It is this
kind of project on which the remainder of our discussion focuses.
In our Harry Potter scenario, we are engaging in a crowdsourced
project for an expressive purpose, as in the case of a virtual world. The
difference is that, in our Harry Potter scenario, we are borrowing—or
copying or remixing—protected material created and owned by someone
else. Even if we add new text, music, or insights to the video clips, we still
take underlying video clips (and potentially some of the additional music or
text) from works created by others.
Our aim is to express ourselves and our affection for, or commentary
upon, the movies. We do not intend to compete commercially with the

62

JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL 350 (2008) (“[Second Life is an] Internet-based,
virtual world released by Linden Lab in 2003. . . . Inspired by the cyberpunk literary movement, Second
Life is a user-generated world where people can play, interact, do business, and communicate using an
avatar interface and a virtual currency, the Linden dollar, which is tied to the U.S. dollar.”).
63
An “avatar” is “a graphical image that represents a person, as on the Internet.” Avatar,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/avatar?s=t [http://perma.cc/9FLR-WN2H].
64
Two examples of information or data-based crowdsourcing include the traffic and navigation app
Waze and the health app OutSmart Flu. See Jacquelyn Bengfort, Crowdsourcing Campus Health with
Mobile Apps and Data, EDTECH (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.edtechmagazine.com/
higher/article/2013/11/crowdsourcing-campus-health-mobile-apps-and-data
[http://perma.cc/FS8CN7C8] (“Waze users form a community, allowing them to report hazards and accidents through the app,
which sends out updates to other users in the area. . . . Like Waze, OutSmart Flu appeals to users’
altruism. ‘It’s not unlike if you and I were to meet, and I wasn’t feeling well, and you put out your hand
to shake mine. I might say, “You don’t want to touch me, I’m not feeling well.”’ OutSmart Flu lets the
UW–Madison community amplify that warning to a larger group.”).
65
See supra notes 10–18 and accompanying text.
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copyright owners. However, copyright law to date has not done a
particularly good job of clarifying whether, or the extent to which, this kind
of noncompetitive expressive use of protected works can be regarded as
fair use.66 In other words, if we ask ten copyright lawyers whether our
Harry Potter remix would be protected by the fair use doctrine, we could
easily get ten different, nuanced responses. The answers would likely
depend on variables such as where the remix is posted, whether there is
advertising revenue generated from it and how many video clips we use,
how long they are, and the context in which they are used.67 However, in
any formal opinion letter, virtually all of the lawyers would agree on one
thing: our safest course of action would be to get a license. The reason is
simple: even if there is a compelling reason to believe that our planned
activity falls under the fair use exception, there is always a chance that a
court would disagree. Therefore, to protect us from liability and to
immunize themselves from a malpractice suit—lest you rely on their advice
and things go awry—rational lawyers will generally recommend paying the
rights holder. Considerable rights accretion for copyright holders results
from the fear of litigation (no matter the outcome) and the need for legal
counsel to protect itself from allegations of malpractice.
This Article seeks to identify whether there are ways in which the law
could provide clearer, upfront guidance to expressive remixers about the
degree to which their activities may be regarded as fair use, or otherwise
lawful. While this discussion will apply to individual as well as
crowdsourced remixes, the latter may raise different concerns to copyright
holders than the former, depending on the scope and scale of the group
project. As our case study of the Star Wars: Uncut project, discussed in
Part II, demonstrates, crowdsourcing enables the creation of new work, the
individually contributed components of which may not infringe copyrights
but which taken as a whole may amount to infringement.68
To borrow from computer science terminology, thinking separately
about “inputs” and “outputs” of a creative crowdsourced project assists in
the analysis. Inputs represent those elements of a crowdsourced project that
are contributed by individual participants. Inputs are then collated together,
either by the group as a whole or by the project organizers, to create a
single output: the finished crowdsourced work. The output may be fixed as
to form or may be constantly updated.
66

The fair use doctrine and its ambiguities will be discussed in further depth in infra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., No. 00 Civ. 5002(LMM), 2005
WL 774275, at *7–11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2005) (weighing a fair use defense for a Good Morning
America segment exploring portrayal of aliens in American film by considering, inter alia, the
commerciality of the segment as well as the number of clips used, their nature and length, and their
contextual proximity to the segment’s commentary).
68
See infra Part II.D.
67
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For example, in our Harry Potter scenario, “inputs” include the
individual video clips our friends forward to us. Together, we mash up the
videos to create the “output”—the completed fan remix video. Unlike
Wikipedia—a crowdsourced project whose output is constantly evolving—
we might choose to fix the form of our remix such that it will not change
after we have posted it publicly.
In the case of the Harry Potter remix, our inputs are likely to be
predominantly drawn from the work of others. If our work is a compilation
of our favorite scenes from the movies, perhaps joined together with some
commentary or music, much of that input will be protected work. Some of
these individual borrowings may, at least in theory, infringe copyrights.69
Additionally, our final product—the crowdsourced remix—may itself
infringe copyright.70 The remix would undoubtedly be regarded as a
derivative work drawn from the work of others, and, of course, copyright
law reserves to original copyright holders the right to make derivative
works.
But with both inputs and outputs, there is a potential fair use defense.
For example, we could argue that our uses are fairly minor in substance71
and are not commercially competing with Warner Brothers’ copyrighted
movies.72 We might also argue express or implied license, if Warner
Brothers has ever released video clips for use by fans for noncommercial
purposes.73 While our fair use arguments may have a good chance of
success, the only way to know for sure would be to incur the costs of going
to court and arguing the case.
Additionally, it is worth noting that some crowdsourced creative
projects may look more like copyright infringement than others. Star Wars:
Uncut, for example,74 is a creative crowdsourced project that recreates the
entire storyline of Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope.75 Because it is a
full-length movie in and of itself and follows the general storyline of the
original movie, it may more easily be regarded as infringing on Lucasfilm’s

69

Posting to the Internet individual scenes from copyrighted films violates, inter alia, the copyright
holder’s exclusive right to reproduce, publicly perform, and make derivative versions of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(2), (4) (2012).
70
See id.
71
See id. § 107(3).
72
See id. § 107(4).
73
Conduct and communications by a rights holder can, depending on their context and nature, give
rise to a cognizable implied license to make use of protected works in ways that go beyond any express
agreement. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing an implied license
from context of rights holder’s conduct).
74
See discussion infra Part II.D.
75
STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977).
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(now Disney’s76) derivative works right than, say, our hypothetical Harry
Potter remix. However, the question remains whether such a derivative
work actually does any harm to Disney’s valuable property. Although
modern courts are unlikely to see it this way, the work might in fact
increase the market for the original movie by reminding people how much
they enjoyed the movie and that they would like to watch it again and
compare it with the remix.77
These issues are taken up in more detail below. Part II examines the
mechanics of copyright law as it might apply in the crowdsourced remix
context. It focuses specifically on the application of the fair use defense in
this context. However, before turning to that discussion, it is important to
identify the kinds of social interests inherent in online remixing. Having
identified these interests, we then examine whether today’s copyright law is
capable of appropriately protecting these interests in a meaningful way.
Copyright law should ideally be able to effectively balance the rights of
copyright holders against the interests of others who may seek to use
protected works in an expressive manner. To the extent the law fails to
create such a balance, it may ultimately chill more artistic innovation than
it facilitates.
C. Crowdsourcing and Consumer Interests in Copyright Works
Both individual and crowdsourced remixing have represented an
important source of creative enterprise for many generations. Our copyright
laws and their surrounding mythology of creativity have historically
embraced a romantic notion of authorship—one that envisions creative
enterprise as the product of a lone genius conceiving of canonical works ex
nihilo.78 Despite its powerful imagery, this romantic canard has never fully
captured the realities of artistic creation. Notwithstanding the popular idea
that creators operate in a vacuum, authors in the material world inevitably
“stand on the shoulders of giants” by building on the work of others to
arrive at their creative output.79 Throughout history, the act of creation has
been an iterative process. In some cases, this process has involved the
76

Matt Krantz et al., Disney Buys Lucasfilm for $4 Billion, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/30/disney-star-wars-lucasfilm/1669739/
[http://perma.cc/K3C7-ZJJ8].
77
See David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359,
378–85 (2014) (articulating a taxonomy of ways in which unauthorized uses of copyrighted works of
authorship may enhance, rather than reduce, demand for the work).
78
See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 51–60 (1996); James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and
the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–63.
79
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511
(1945).
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collective efforts of dozens or even hundreds of individuals who revise and
edit works over the course of months or years, often independently of one
another (sometimes unwittingly, as in our next example), passing around
drafts until the work reaches a final fixed form. In other words, creative
crowdsourcing has taken place since time immemorial even though the
process occurred organically and without an entity or individual
intentionally mining the creativity of the crowd.
The Serenity Prayer provides a powerful example of this heretofore
underappreciated process in action. While using Google Books as well as
several other digital archives, Yale Law School librarian Fred Shapiro
recently discovered that the most famous piece of liturgy in the twentieth
century80 may not have been authored by the man who has historically
received credit for the text, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.81 Shapiro
uncovered various versions of The Serenity Prayer’s text published and in
use as early as 1936—at least five years before Niebuhr had apparently
claimed its creation.82 As Shapiro speculates, Niebuhr may have
subconsciously adopted the prayer as his own after having come into
contact with prior incarnations.83 Indeed, Shapiro’s work led to the
unearthing of a number of prior versions of the Prayer that existed before
the date of Niebuhr’s ostensible creation, when the Prayer took “final” and
“official” form. Like different versions of an edited page on Wikipedia,
these iterations of the Prayer gradually evolved into the precise verbiage
and format of the final product that we know today: “God grant me the
serenity to accept / the things I cannot change, / courage to change the
things I can, / and wisdom to know the difference.”84 As such, Shapiro’s
new evidence suggests that the work was collective in nature and that it
was crowdsourced in voluntary, educational, and religious circles for a
number of years before being popularly attributed to Niebuhr.85
80

Fred R. Shapiro, Who Wrote the Serenity Prayer?, YALE ALUMNI MAG., July–Aug. 2008, at 34–
35, 37, available at http://archives.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2008_07/serenity.html [http://
perma.cc/6C8L-6WPY].
81
Id. at 35.
82
Id. at 35, 37–38. Interestingly, the prior versions of the Prayer unearthed by Shapiro were by
women, most of whom were involved in some sort of volunteer and educational activity. Elisabeth
Sifton, It Takes a Master to Make a Masterpiece, YALE ALUMNI MAG., July–Aug. 2008, at 40,
available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3416 [http://perma.cc/L6LN-GKFK].
83
Shapiro, supra note 80, at 39. Elisabeth Sifton, Niebuhr’s daughter, has adamantly denied
Shapiro’s allegations. In an intervention entitled It Takes a Master to Make a Masterpiece, she argues,
among other things, that the prayer must have come from a gifted practitioner from a particular
theological context who could have only been her father. Sifton, supra note 82, at 40–41. Interestingly,
the title of her article immediately plays into our most romantic notions of authorship, which seek to
reduce creation to a lone genius rather than to the iterative and accretive contributions of many.
84
See WILLIAM V. PIETSCH, THE SERENITY PRAYER BOOK (1992).
85
In 2009, Duke researcher Stephen Goranson found a citation to Niebuhr as the Prayer’s author
contained in a Christian student newsletter published in 1937. Laurie Goodstein, Serenity Prayer
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Thus, crowdsourcing creation is not a new phenomenon. However, it
has long gone unnoticed and unappreciated. In part, the romantic
mythology surrounding Western notions of authors (as in the case of
Niebuhr and The Serenity Prayer) has deemphasized the existence of
crowdsourcing. In addition, the reality of crowdsourcing complicates
authorship issues and legal rights.86 And since the operation of
crowdsourcing in the past has occurred over the course of many years and
in relative obscurity (often times even accidentally and without coordinated
effort), it has not received much attention. However, with the speed and
visibility of modern digital collaboration over networked technologies,
crowdsourced creative activities are now everywhere we look, especially
online.
As with any transformative utilization of underlying creative materials,
the act of creative crowdsourcing vindicates critical interests for both its
participants and the public. To this end, it is worth focusing on two
particular ends achieved by transformative activities. First, transformative
uses advance the utilitarian goals of the copyright regime by giving the
public new creative works imbued with original insights, meanings, and
messages.87 Second, beyond merely serving the core function of the
copyright regime, transformative interactions with creative works also
advance identity formation and expressive interests by mediating the
development of cultural networks, regulating or undermining insider–
outsider relationships, and demarcating or blurring social strata.88
Specifically, our ability to make (or not make) transformative use of
cultural content shapes identity formation, and our ability to exhibit or
display publicly such uses impacts the way in which individuals can engage
in semiotic use of cultural content and, thereby, express themselves to the
world.
As one of us has previously argued, identity formation takes place
internally as an individual’s sense of self “is shaped through interaction
Skeptic Now Credits Niebuhr, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A11. Shapiro responded that “[t]he new
evidence does not prove that Reinhold Niebuhr wrote [The Serenity Prayer], but it does significantly
improve the likelihood that he was the originator,” and that he would list The Serenity Prayer under
Niebuhr’s name in the next edition of The Yale Book of Quotations. Id.
86
For example, it raises issues of originality that might call into question the relatively low bar for
copyrightability post-Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Id.
at 346 (finding that the federal copyright regime’s originality requirement only necessitates
“independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”). It may also lead to important questions about
who might count as an author or joint author under 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
87
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works.”).
88
See generally John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP
(Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 23 (2011).
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with objects in the external world. . . . [T]he expression of personhood
occurs when the individual communicates some aspect of her (already
formed) identity to others as a way of contextualizing herself, through her
relationship with objects, within the broader community.”89 These objects,
of course, include those of an intangible nature, including the films, music,
books, art, and television that comprise popular culture. Transformative
interactions with creative works mediate the development of social
relationships by allowing users to draw upon those creative works for
expressive purposes, couching their interests or activities within a
particular context—communicating their alignment with cultural, political,
and economic networks and facilitating their interaction with the broader
community.90 Expressive interaction with creative works also allows users
to define their relationship with, and status in, their social milieu—be it
oppositional or harmonious, insider or outsider. The creative choices users
make when creating fan mash-ups, music remixes, or parodies of popular
television shows or movies communicate important details about users’
perceived relationships with the world, their self-images, and their links to
certain social, cultural, or political networks.91 A musical parody of
Disney’s wildly popular Frozen film called “Fuck It All,” for instance,
communicates a tongue-in-cheek disdain for the ubiquitous “Let It Go” and
positions the creator of the parody as outside of the mainstream audience
for the film,92 whereas a more traditional, homage-style Breaking Bad
remix video may announce that its creators see themselves as in-the-know
cultural insiders.93
Transformative interactions with creative works also serve personhood
interests by serving to demarcate or blur social boundaries. Where class
lines were once easily defined and perceived by tangible property markers
such as cars, homes, or brand of jeans, the explosion of technologies that
gives users access to creative content online can have either subversive
consequences by neutralizing those boundaries, or hegemonic
consequences by giving new means to solidifying those boundaries. On the
former point, for example, the advancement of identity formation and
expressive interests through transformation of creative works, instead of
through the conspicuous consumption of days past, can unshackle users
from the constraints of their pocketbooks and can free them to express
themselves to limits defined only by their creativity and imagination.
89

Id.
Id. at 30.
91
Id. at 31.
92
Iodine Cerium, Fuck It All – Parody of Let It Go, YOUTUBE (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DlZdZYLCfU [http://perma.cc/VV8K-8Q2G].
93
Mc GillaCutty, Breaking Bad Remix (Seasons 1 and 2), YOUTUBE (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yd9vW_lfsk [http://perma.cc/QSF9-SNXS].
90
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Contributing a scene to Star Wars: Uncut, for instance, announces
alignment with the global Star Wars fan community—income or social
strata be damned. People once separated by class (or race, age, or gender)
can now forge connections through collaborative creative efforts that
transcend those categories. On the latter point, limiting the ability of users
to engage in transformative uses of certain creative works can create a
world of expressive “haves” and “have-nots” and can further perpetuate
existing social hierarchies by determining who, for example, might be able
to make meaningful use of important patriotic or cultural symbols and to
what end.94
Thus, ordinary transformative works advance both the constitutionally
mandated goal of the copyright regime—progress in the arts—and the
expressive and personhood interests of the individuals who create and
consume them. Critically, for the purposes of our analysis, crowdsourced
transformative works have the potential to provide even further benefits
along both lines.
First, crowdsourced transformative activity may result in particular
types of creative output that ordinary transformative activity is unlikely to
produce. Thus, crowdsourced transformative activity fuels progress in the
arts. After all, by accessing the knowledge, cultural experiences, and
perspectives of hundreds (if not hundreds of thousands) of individuals,
crowdsourcing has the unique ability to harness the strength of collective
wisdom and insight. This can result in a final creation that draws on
elements of which any one author (or group of authors who exist in a
common social circle) would be unable, or at least unlikely, to make use.
In the parlance of documentarian Kirby Ferguson, who wrote and
directed the powerful and poignant Everything Is a Remix series, creative
evolution is—like physical evolution—a process of copying, transforming,
and combining,95 except instead of genes, the raw materials for creative
evolution are memes.96 Crowdsourcing enables the copying,
transformation, and combination of memes in a unique manner. It speeds
up cultural evolution and also enables the creation of unknown blends and
fusions. This mixing and remixing of cultural memes from around the
globe is a dynamic amalgamating process that spurs innovation by giving
rise to new forms of creativity.
94

Tehranian, supra note 88, at 33–56 (using the examples of intellectual property rights to flags,
the term “Olympic,” and songs associated with cultural heritage and pride to illustrate how referential,
reverential, and subversive uses of creative works can impact insider–outsider boundaries within
mainstream society and perpetuate or attack social hierarchies).
95
Kirby Ferguson, Everything Is a Remix Part 4: System Failure, EVERYTHING IS A REMIX (Feb.
16, 2012), http://everythingisaremix.info/blog/everything-is-a-remix-part-4 [http://perma.cc/K2TX669J].
96
Id.
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Wikipedia exemplifies the ability of crowdsourcing to yield
remarkable results from the proper harnessing of collective knowledge.97
Indeed, by some measures, Wikipedia is nearly as factually accurate as
such traditional repositories of knowledge as the Encyclopedia Britannica,
and the two services achieve similar accuracy marks for serious errors.98
And it does so while remaining more nimble and timely than the laudable
encyclopedias of yore.99 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, unlike the
learned tomes of the twentieth century, it is readily and freely accessible by
anyone.
Second, crowdsourced creative activities vindicate particularly unique
expressive interests. The process of creating crowdsourced works often
involves collaboration across the world through networked technologies,
which allows individuals to engage with new technologies in a highly
collaborative manner. It also enables those engaged in crowdsourcing to
create at speeds never before possible. Casey Pugh, the creator of Star
Wars: Uncut, said that one of the motivations for engaging in the project
was to ascertain how fast he could make an entire film through
crowdsourcing.100 It took him only nine to ten months to get all of the
scenes he needed to put the film together101 and, by all accounts, the time
taken to get the scenes together for his current project, The Empire Strikes

97

Admittedly, Wikipedia represents more of an example of functional, rather than expressive,
crowdsourcing. Nevertheless, the benefits it exemplifies from the harnessing of collective experiences
and perspectives can advantage progress in the creative realm as well.
98
See Daniel Terdiman, Study: Wikipedia as Accurate as Britannica, CNET NEWS (Dec. 15, 2005,
3:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Study-Wikipedia-as-accurate-as-Britannica/2100-1038_3-5997332.
html [http://perma.cc/L5VJ-WXNQ] (citing a peer-review–expert study in Nature comparing side-byside entries in Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica on a variety of topics, and concluding that the
two services achieve similar accuracy marks); see also Tim Worstall, It’s an Interesting World Where
Wikipedia Is More Accurate than Both the CIA and the Wall Street Journal, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2013,
5:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/12/06/its-an-interesting-world-where-wiki
pedia-is-more-accurate-than-both-the-cia-and-the-wall-street-journal/
[http://perma.cc/GA92-3XS3]
(providing anecdotal evidence that Wikipedia’s use of statistical measurements of inequality and
poverty is more accurate than the CIA and Wall Street Journal’s use thereof).
99
But see Tom Simonite, The Decline of Wikipedia, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 22, 2013,
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520446/the-decline-of-wikipedia/
[http://perma.cc/
3U2D-UUWX] (critiquing Wikipedia for, inter alia, the 90% male demographic of its administrators, its
“crushing bureaucracy,” its “abrasive atmosphere that deters newcomers,” and its “skewed coverage: its
entries on Pokemon and female porn stars are comprehensive, but its pages on female novelists or
places in sub-Saharan Africa are sketchy”).
100
Lesley Coffin, Tribeca: Interview with Star Wars Uncut Creator Casey Pugh, FILMORIA (Apr.
18, 2013), http://www.filmoria.co.uk/2013/04/tribeca-interview-with-star-wars-uncut-creator-caseypugh/ [http://perma.cc/5LH2-VL8B] (“I was also just interested in how fast I could remake a film using
crowdsourcing.”).
101
Id. (“[W]ithin [nine] or [ten] months, I got all the scenes and Star Wars Uncut was born.”).
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Back: Uncut, was even less.102 Pugh is also now experimenting with
crowdsourcing to make the viewing experience for his Empire Strikes Back
project more interactive, allowing viewers to choose between versions of
the scenes they want to experience.103 Thus, crowdsourced remixes not only
offer new avenues for those providing creative inputs to a project, but also
offer new ways for those experiencing the work to engage with what they
see and hear.
All told, crowdsourcing contributes to progress in the arts by
encouraging the creation and dissemination of new artistic works.
Meanwhile, it also vindicates important expressive interests. Yet, despite
these seemingly positive virtues, crowdsourcing faces serious obstacles.
While crowdsourcing is not a new phenomenon, it is now more visible and
ubiquitous than ever before. And with its new high profile have come new
legal challenges. The explosion of creative crowdsourcing activities raises
serious copyright concerns and forces our legal regime on creative
monopolies to address issues that were never fully anticipated by the
Framers, let alone the drafters who gave us the (still reigning) Copyright
Act of 1976.
II. EXPRESSIVE CROWDSOURCING AND COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright Infringement
Copyright law protects the rights of those who create literary, artistic,
dramatic, and musical works.104 Its goal is to foster innovation in these
areas by granting limited rights to authors to reap the commercial rewards
of their efforts.105 Absent copyright law, others could reproduce and exploit
102

Id. (“In less than a year, Star Wars Uncut was edited into a single, feature length remake of Star
Wars: A New Hope. A few years later he began work on The Empire Strikes Back Uncut and in a third
of the time, every scene was complete.”).
103
Id. (“What I ended up doing for A New Hope Uncut was what we call a director’s cut, where I
literally hand picked scenes which I thought would make the most entertaining final cut of the project.
We have a liking system online, but even that wasn’t always the best way. And there are multiple
versions with different scenes in each version. For The Empire Strikes Back Uncut, we will be releasing
some new ways to watch different versions as well.”).
104
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 2 (“[T]he first copyright act gave authors the exclusive right to
make copies of their books. Today, copyright law covers much broader ground, including not only most
artistic, literary, and musical works, but computer software and some kinds of databases as well.”).
105
Id. at 21–22 (“Without specifying the form of protection, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States
Constitution empowers Congress to legislate copyright and patent statutes, conferring a limited
monopoly on writings and inventions. By implication, the Constitution recognizes that copyright law
plays an important role in our market economy. Rather than encouraging production of works by
government subsidy, or awards or prizes, the author is given, through the limited monopoly of
copyright law, a private property right over his creation, the worth of which will ultimately be
determined by the market. The underlying policy of this constitutional provision is to promote the
public welfare through private market incentives.”).
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the works of a creator without recompense. Under the Copyright Act, a
copyright owner—who may or may not be the author of the work—is
granted a number of exclusive rights.106 These rights include the right to
reproduce the work and the right to make derivative works based on the
original work. Copyright holders are also granted the exclusive rights to
distribute protected works to the public, to publicly display the works, and
to engage in public performances of relevant works. These rights are
tempered by several defenses, the most relevant for the purposes of this
discussion being the fair use defense.107
All of these rights may be implicated in expressive crowdsourced
remixes both in terms of their inputs and their output. If the inputs to a
Harry Potter fan video remix are film and music clips from the movies,
and perhaps from some other sources, most if not all of the inputs will be
copyrighted. When individuals contribute parts of existing works into a
creative crowdsourced project, each individual will be reproducing the
relevant segment of the work, and potentially contravening the copyright
holder’s reproduction right.
To the extent that the project organizers also make copies of those
segments, they may additionally infringe the reproduction right. Further,
they may be infringing the copyright holder’s derivative works right.
Where the crowdsourced work is effectively a digital collage based on
Harry Potter or some other particular protected work, the resulting product
is likely a derivative work. Other common examples of derivative works
include unauthorized prequels and sequels based on popular books or
movies.108
One salient difference between a crowdsourced digital remix and a
more traditional derivative work (like a prequel or sequel) is that the remix
is less likely to be for commercial profit and is less likely to occupy a
market space that the copyright holder would exploit. Whereas one might
argue that the market for sequels and prequels should be reserved to the
copyright holder as a logical extension of its original market, the same is
less true for most remixes, at least those of a noncommercial nature.
The copyright holder’s exclusive public performance and distribution
rights might also be implicated by remixing activities. In the digital age,
courts have held that disseminating copyrighted works online may,
depending on the circumstances, amount to a public performance,109 public
106

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
Id. § 107.
108
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, A Taxonomy of Borrowing, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 951, 980 (2014).
109
See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (holding that a system for the electronic delivery of movies via video to hotel guests in
different rooms in a hotel was a public performance).
107
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display,110 or a distribution to the public.111 Thus, when remixers post their
creations online, they are arguably displaying, distributing, or publicly
performing those works under broad judicial interpretations of these terms.
Individual contributors to a crowdsourced remix likely do not infringe
these particular rights if they simply send their input directly to the
organizer of the remix. A private communication of a copyrighted work
may infringe the reproduction right to the extent that it involves a digital
copy being made of the work during the transmission process, but it is
unlikely to be regarded as sufficiently “public” to infringe these other
rights.
B. Creative Crowdsourcing: The Trouble with Several Arguments Against
Infringement Under Current Law
Multiple arguments have been made, mostly unsuccessfully, in favor
of limiting liability for remixers. For example, one might argue that the
uses of existing works by remixers are simply de minimis. One might also
think that no copyright holder would ever sue—or threaten to sue—over
these kinds of uses, or that a plaintiff could never establish sufficient harm
to sway a court to grant a remedy. However, evidence suggests that
copyright holders often sue or threaten to sue individuals for apparently
nonharmful, noncommercial uses of their works.112 They regularly issue
takedown notices to popular media-sharing sites such as YouTube.113 This
effectively puts the onus on the alleged infringer to prove a defense, such
as fair use, before the fact. Although fair use is a complete defense to a
copyright infringement claim, it is very difficult for an individual with
limited resources and limited knowledge of copyright law to establish fair
use outside the litigation context. Even within the litigation context, the
burden of proving fair use falls squarely on the defendant,114 and it is a
110

See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that
a computer bulletin board operator may be held liable for displaying a work to the public where the
work was originally posted on the bulletin board by a third party; the display is regarded as being
“public” even if only a limited number of bulletin board subscribers can access it).
111
Id. at 1559.
112
JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 99 (2011) (noting the
onslaught of copyright suits brought by the Recording Industry Association of America against peer-topeer file sharers); id. at 149 (noting that thousands of individual music file sharers have faced suits
brought by the Recording Industry Association of America and its members).
113
Id. at 134–35 (describing the way in which content holders have issued takedown notices to
YouTube in the most questionable cases of copyright infringement); id. at 135–36 (example of
Universal’s use of a takedown notice, issued to YouTube, to have YouTube remove a home video of a
small child dancing to Prince’s hit single “Let’s Go Crazy” on the basis of copyright infringement).
114
Id. at 5 (“[F]air use is an affirmative defense. Although this fact makes little difference to
theorists speaking about fair use in a vacuum, it makes a profound difference to copyright defendants
facing the specter of multiple millions in liability in federal court as the doctrine places the burden
squarely on the defendant to prove fair use.”).
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burden few private individuals can bear in practice—often for reasons
having nothing to do with the merits of the defense.
Although remix artists’ uses of copyrighted materials may be seen as
inconsequential, or at least as not causing any significant commercial harm
to a copyright holder, courts have generally ignored arguments about de
minimis uses in the copyright context.115 Additionally, copyright courts
have, in general, broadly construed notions of commercial use and
commercial harm to a copyright holder.116
A second argument that has largely failed is that people who create fan
remixes in the form of homage to, or parody of, the original work would
never be sued because they would positively affect the copyright holder’s
bottom line. In other words, much fan activity provides free publicity for
copyright holders and should be welcomed or even encouraged. While
many copyright holders encourage, welcome, or at least ignore fan works,
others prefer to assert more absolute control over their works. For example,
Summit Entertainment has been particularly proprietary about even de
minimis fan uses of material from its popular Twilight film franchise.117
Copyright holders may want to control all aspects of marketing and
publicity themselves or may desire royalties for use of proprietary materials
even where charging a royalty chills free publicity within the fan
community.
Another argument against infringement liability is that remixing is
predominantly an expressive activity and that expressive uses of
copyrighted works should receive protection under the First Amendment.
However, in recent copyright jurisprudence, courts have held that the fair
use defense provides the necessary balance between free speech and
copyright.118 Thus, the First Amendment argument against copyright
infringement is dealt with by saying that a defendant making an expressive
use can rely on the fair use defense. For example, the Supreme Court
115

Id. at 13 (“[A] de minimus-use [sic] defense is typically ignored by courts in copyright cases.”).
Id. (“[C]ourts have frequently adopted broad readings of what constitutes commercial use.”); id.
at 14 (“[O]ne could argue that virtually all use is commercial in nature because, at some level, any
unpaid use of a copyrighted work causes someone to lose potential revenue.”).
117
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 19, at 37–42.
118
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[C]opyright’s built-in free speech
safeguards are generally adequate to address [any conflict with free speech rights].”); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting that copyright law needs no
independent First Amendment scrutiny because it already incorporates such concerns through its
“distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use”); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791,
795 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Copyright law incorporates First Amendment goals by ensuring that copyright
protection extends only to the forms in which ideas and information are expressed and not to the ideas
and information themselves.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir.
1989) (“[T]he fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of [F]irst [A]mendment in the copyright field.”).
116
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famously stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft that copyright is generally immunized
from independent First Amendment scrutiny because it only restricts the
ability of individuals to make “other people’s” speech, not their own.119
Although the Supreme Court’s distinction between an individual’s
own speech and the speech of others might make sense when read against
copyright law as it existed at the time of the Framing—when it only
prohibited direct, one-to-one copying of books and maps—the dichotomy
has become less clear because copyright now protects derivative works.
Whereas in some cases, there may be little doubt that an accused infringer
is merely making another’s speech (as in Eldred, where the accused
infringer adopted, word-for-word, the writings of others), there are a
multitude of transformative instances where accused infringers combine the
fruit of another’s intellectual labor with their own to create something new
and original. For example, George Harrison was famously and successfully
found liable for subconscious infringement when he purportedly usurped
key elements from the Chiffons’ 1963 doo–wop hit “He’s So Fine” in
composing his stately and saturnine spiritual “My Sweet Lord.”120 Yet there
is little doubt that his composition contained strong elements of his speech,
including his unique lyrical and musical sensibilities. Such uses as
Harrison’s can and should muddy the notion of speech ownership.
Nevertheless, as it stands, copyright claims generally enjoy immunity from
independent First Amendment scrutiny.121
Another potential argument against liability is that remixers are
usually “innocent infringers”—that few remixers have any intention to
infringe the copyrights of the underlying rights holders of the sampled
works. Indeed, a brief survey of fan video mash-ups on YouTube suggests
that many remixers assume this to be a legitimate defense: remixers who
reuse copyright materials without permission often affix notices to their
mash-ups stating that no infringement was intended.122 Presumably,
remixers have done this to negate a claim of copyright infringement, on the
mistaken assumption that a copyright infringement action includes a mens
rea requirement.123

119

Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg pronounced that “[t]he First Amendment securely
protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when
speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
The Court then confidently asserted that copyright law’s built-in checks—rather than heightened
constitutional scrutiny—could generally solve any potential free speech issues. Id.
120
See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 178–79 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (demonstrating the musical similarities between the two motifs), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
121
But see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001).
122
Lipton, supra note 19, at 22–23.
123
Id. at 23.
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Most remixers—in fact, most people who are not copyright lawyers—
do not realize that copyright infringement attaches strict liability.124 There is
no mens rea requirement for infringement.125 Thus, even an individual with
no intent to infringe may be liable for direct infringement if she performed
any of the acts reserved to the copyright holder. The affixation of a notice
to a work asserting that “no infringement was intended” is irrelevant to
liability. The question, therefore, becomes whether the law, as it currently
stands, is striking an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright
holders and those of creative and expressive users who do not intend to
compete with the copyright holders. The answer appears to be no because
with First Amendment and innocent infringement defenses unavailing,126
artists are left to seek salvation in the fair use doctrine. Unfortunately, such
reliance is all too often unhelpful.
C. Remixing and Fair Use
As noted in the previous Section, many have argued that fair use is the
solution to concerns about overzealous enforcement of copyrights.127
Because fair use is touted as the answer to First Amendment concerns, it
bears detailed scrutiny in the remixing context. However, the application of
the fair use defense is problematic in practice largely because of its
unpredictability and because it can be used only as a sword and not a
shield. In other words, fair use can be raised only as a defense in an
infringement action.128 It cannot be effectively established outside this
124

TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 13 (“[C]opyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea
requirement for liability. Infringement occurs whether an individual acts with bad faith or complete
innocence.”).
125
Id.
126
Innocent state of mind does not ever impact the liability calculus, but it can impact damages
awards. See, e.g., D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] finding of
innocent infringement does not absolve the defendant of liability under the Copyright Act. Rather, it
triggers an equitable remedy that affords the district court discretion to award damages commensurate
with the defendant’s culpability.” (citation omitted)). Actual damages are not mitigated in any way by a
defense of innocent infringement, but statutory damages can be. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012);
Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Even an innocent
infringer is liable for infringement. . . . Innocence is only significant to a trial court when it fixes
statutory damages, which is a remedy equitable in nature.”); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent
Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 182–83 (2007) (noting
the declining value of the innocent infringement defense through the course of American copyright
history).
127
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Because of the First Amendment principles built into copyright law through the idea/expression
dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain related First Amendment
arguments in a copyright case.”).
128
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts about whether a given use is fair should not
be resolved in favor of the self-proclaimed parodist. We should not make it easy for musicians to
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context. In addition, fair use jurisprudence has provided enough
unfavorable precedent against remixing activities that a well-financed
rights holder can make colorable, if not ultimately winning, infringement
claims against remixing defendants.
The fair use defense was initially developed through case law as an
equitable rule of reason that could be adapted to new fact scenarios.129 It
retained this flexible quality when Congress incorporated it into the 1976
Copyright Act. As legislatively enacted, the defense provides courts with a
list of at least four interests they must balance in any given case, but it
provides little additional guidance. In practice, this gives rise to great ex
ante uncertainty about the outcome of a fair use defense.
The text of the defense appears in § 107 of the Copyright Act and
provides that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.130

Section 107 sets out examples of particular activities—such as
criticism, comment, teaching, scholarship, and research—that are typically
regarded as fair use. However, the statute does not demand that a court
deem such uses fair. Instead, it simply provides examples of the types of
practices that past cases may have excused from liability under the fair use
doctrine. As it turns out, courts have frequently denied fair use defenses for
some of the examples seemingly contained in the statute itself, including
news reporting, classroom photocopying, and research.131 For example, in
exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the
original.”).
129
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 487 (“The doctrine of fair use is a judicially created defense to
copyright infringement that allows a third party to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner
without the copyright owner’s consent. Although codified in the 1976 Act, the doctrine of fair use has
retained its nature as an equitable rule of reason to be applied where a finding of infringement would
either be unfair or undermine ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”).
130
§ 107.
131
Id.
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Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a fair use defense brought by a television news broadcast that used
thirty seconds of a four-minute video capturing the infamous beating of
Reginald Denny in Los Angeles in 1992.132 Other circuit courts have not
hesitated to reject fair use defenses for the photocopying of copyrighted
materials for classroom133 or scientific research purposes.134 Meanwhile, to
add to the ambiguity, the case law is clear that none of the four fair use
factors listed in § 107 are necessarily determinative in any given case.
Indeed, the factors may be weighted differently from case to case and from
court to court.135
Along with the flexibility in application of the fair use factors comes
flexibility in interpretation of each factor. For example, as epitomized by
the landmark Supreme Court case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, courts have
imported a “transformative use” test into the first factor: the purpose or
character of the defendant’s use.136 However, even the nature of
transformative use is fluid in practice. Originally, a court was more likely
to find fair use under the first factor where the defendant’s use was
transformative in the sense of adding new meanings and perspectives to the
plaintiff’s work.137 The most obvious and most often upheld type of fair use

132

108 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1997).
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“This is a copyright infringement case. The corporate defendant, Michigan Document Services, Inc., is
a commercial copyshop that reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship,
bound the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to students for use in fulfilling reading
assignments given by professors at the University of Michigan. The copyshop acted without permission
from the copyright holders . . . .”). But the digital world is different. See Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012); J.D. Lipton, Copyright, Plagiarism, and Emerging
Norms in Digital Publishing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 585 (2014).
134
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), amended by 60 F.3d 913
(2d Cir. 1994). However, digitization of library materials has recently been allowed in several cases as a
fair use with reference to the ease of access and use for scientific and research purposes, amongst other
issues. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Authors Guild, Inc. v.
Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2013 WL 603193 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013).
135
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 488 (“[T]he fair use defense continues to defy precise definition and
remains an ad hoc equitable rule of reason where finding an infringement would undermine the ultimate
purpose of copyright law.”).
136
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 40 (noting that this test was imported from Judge Pierre Leval’s
article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, and that Judge Leval, in this article, advocated making
transformative use the focus of the first factor of the fair use test); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1990).
137
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 156 (noting the Supreme Court’s reigning definition of
“transformative use” as holding that a work “is transformative if it ‘adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message’”
(alteration in original)).
133
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in this regard has been parody of, and sometimes other forms of
commentary on, an original work.138
More recently, however, courts have started using the transformative
use test in a different way, focusing not just on transexpressive uses but
also on transpurposive ones (i.e., the new functional aspects of the
defendant’s use). Thus, courts have held that a defendant makes a
transformative use of the plaintiff’s work in cases where the defendant’s
use does not add any new insights to the work, but rather presents it in a
new technological or functional context.139 For example, courts have held
that directly reproducing a graphical work as a thumbnail image in image
search results is a fair use even though the search engines’ reproductions of
the plaintiffs’ images in and of themselves added no new insights to the
works in question.140 The same results have been obtained even more
recently in cases involving the digitization of materials for full text
searches in libraries and for digitized university coursepacks.141 While the
material itself was not transformed, the new uses to which they were put
were regarded by the court as functionally transformative with respect to
the first factor of the fair use test.142
Other vagaries of the first fair use factor relate to its invitation to a
court to consider whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work “is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”143 One
obvious problem with this approach is that many kinds of uses will fall
138

Id. at 40 (“[F]air use has consistently favored criticism and parody over other transformative
uses. Thus, with the exception of parody, cases have repeatedly demonstrated that the slightest
appropriation of a copyrighted work will result in a finding of infringement . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
139
See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Although Arriba made
exact replications of Kelly’s images, the thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images that
served an entirely different function than Kelly’s original images. Kelly’s images are artistic works
intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience. His images are used to portray
scenes from the American West in an aesthetic manner. Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images in the
thumbnails is unrelated to any aesthetic purpose. Arriba’s search engine functions as a tool to help
index and improve access to images on the internet and their related web sites.”); Authors Guild, 954 F.
Supp. 2d at 291 (“Google’s use of the copyrighted works is highly transformative. Google Books
digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a comprehensive word index that helps readers,
scholars, researchers, and others find books. Google Books has become an important tool for libraries
and librarians and cite-checkers as it helps to identify and find books. The use of book text to facilitate
search through the display of snippets is transformative.”); see also Lipton, supra note 108, at 973.
140
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The fact that
Google incorporates the entire Perfect 10 image into the search engine results does not diminish the
transformative nature of Google’s use. As the district court correctly noted, we determined in Kelly that
even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different
function than the original work.” (citation omitted)); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–20.
141
Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 282; Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB),
2013 WL 603193 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013); see also Lipton, supra note 108, at 974.
142
Lipton, supra note 108, at 974.
143
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
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somewhere in between “commercial use” and “nonprofit educational use.”
Additionally, many educational uses can be regarded as commercial, given
that education itself is increasingly a commercial enterprise. The defense
also does not contemplate nonprofit uses outside the educational context,
perhaps implying that a noncommercial use that is not educational is less
likely to be regarded as a fair use than a noncommercial use that is related
to education.
Even restricting the inquiry to the definition of commercial use has
proved problematic in practice. There are many different ways to define the
term. Courts have not established any consistent guidelines on the
definition.144 In many recent cases, courts have generally erred on the side
of finding a commercial use.145 This has not been a difficult task given that
almost any use not authorized or paid for could be regarded as having
deprived someone of a royalty.146 To the extent that courts easily find
commercial use under the first factor in contexts where the defendant has
allegedly caused some kind of market harm, courts have also tended to
conflate the first factor with the fourth.147 The fourth fair use factor requires
courts to consider the impact of the defendant’s use on the potential market
for or value of the work.148 Given the similarity of the issues that may be
considered under the first and fourth factors, a court can often effectively
“double count” or at least overemphasize elements of a defendant’s
conduct that might implicate both factors.
Given all of these uncertainties inherent in applying the first fair use
factor, the challenges for creative remixing begin to come into sharp relief.
Remixes may or may not be regarded as commentary or parody—the types
of uses most typically protected under the first fair use factor. However,
144

TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 44 (“Finding a meaningful and consistent definition of
commercial use has proved an elusive goal.”).
145
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 496 (“Generally, if a challenged use of a copyrighted work is for
commercial gain, a presumption against fair use arises.”); see, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that file sharing on the Internet constituted
commercial activity because, even though no money was exchanged, users could act as “leeches” and
download music from other people’s computers without reciprocating); Worldwide Church of God v.
Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1113, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the giving away
of thirty thousand free copies of a religious work constituted commercial activity because the defendant
“profited” from the use of the work by attracting new members who might ultimately tithe to the
church). As the Supreme Court has noted, “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
146
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 44 (“[F]air use always causes some loss in potential revenue to
someone.”).
147
Id. (“To the extent market harm is an appropriate consideration, it is already covered by the
fourth factor in the fair use test and need not be redundantly considered in the first factor as well.”).
148
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
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even though a use is not a parody, it may yet be expressive and
meaningful.149
Many crowdsourced fan projects will not have any obvious
commercial purpose. One might therefore think that they would be more
likely to be protected as fair use under the first factor. However, there is a
risk that, in some cases of creative crowdsourcing, a commercial aspect
will become incidentally incorporated into the work when it is distributed
online. For example, video mash-ups on YouTube and other similar videosharing services150 may attract advertising revenues and hence be regarded
as a commercial use on that basis. Even where there is no advertising, the
possibility of future advertising revenues may be enough to convince a
court of a commercial use. As an alternative, a video hosting website may
charge fees for access or may have the potential to charge fees in the future,
again potentially satisfying the commercial use element of fair use. Finally,
in some cases, a crowdsourced project may itself attract such a consumer
following that it is potentially commercializable in its own right. This
might (sometimes unwittingly) establish a potential commercial use or
market harm under the first or fourth factors.
The second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted work151—is
unlikely to prove particularly useful for those engaging in creative
crowdsourcing. This factor will frequently cut against crowdsourced
projects in which inputs are themselves copies of segments of creative
works, such as movie and music clips. The second fair use factor generally
grants greater protection to works that lie at the heart of creative innovation
than more functional works such as computer software or informational
works.152 Where the works in question are movies and music, the second
factor will often favor the plaintiff.
The third fair use factor—the amount and substantiality of the portion
of the work used153—could help or hurt a creative crowdsourced project.
While some video mash-ups, for example, will be much shorter than the
works from which they are taken, the third factor might still cut against the
149

TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 42 (“As many appropriationist artists have demonstrated,
something new, expressive, and meaningful can emerge from the combination or alteration of
copyrighted works of the past.”).
150
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 62, at 351 (defining “video-sharing services” as “Websites,
such as YouTube and Metacafe, that allow users to upload video files, including video clips from
popular movies and TV shows as well as original footage”).
151
§ 107(2).
152
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 497 (“The second [fair use] factor reflects the view that to support
the public interest greater access should be allowed to some kinds of works than others. Because the
ultimate goal of copyright law is to increase our fund of information, the fair use privilege is more
extensive for works of information such as scientific, biographical, or historical works than for works of
entertainment.”).
153
§ 107(3).
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crowdsourced project because the factor is not concerned only with
quantity.154 Courts have interpreted the amount and substantiality inquiry as
focusing on what is being taken from an underlying work, not how
significant that use is to the allegedly infringing work.155 Furthermore, if
only a small portion of a work is copied, a court may nevertheless hold that
the taking is qualitatively substantial under the third fair use factor.156 For
example, courts have held that copying the key points of a literary work
may infringe copyright even if the defendant has not copied a large
quantity of the text.157
There are few clear ex ante guidelines as to what kinds of borrowing a
court would consider qualitatively substantial under the third fair use
factor. Even a five-minute fan mash-up may run afoul of the third fair use
factor if a court holds that what has been taken by the defendant is
qualitatively significant. In the case of a longer crowdsourced project like
Star Wars: Uncut, the amount taken by the defendants may be regarded as
both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial under the third factor.
Some examples might be the Johnny Finder video games, which, to a
significant extent, follow the characters and storylines of several Indiana
Jones movies.
In sum, both adverse precedent and its unpredictable nature combine
to make the fair use defense not useful to those seeking to engage in
creative projects by using existing copyrighted works as inputs. Further, the
time and cost burdens associated with litigation may deter many potential
defendants from pursuing a fair use argument. They may instead simply
cease their activities if a copyright holder complains. There is also no
accurate way of counting the number of projects that are never commenced
in the first place for fear of copyright liability.
Again, we are not arguing that copyright protection is unimportant or
that those who develop valuable commercial properties should not be
entitled to protect their markets. Rather, our concern is where the
154

LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 500 (“Questions of amount and substantiality [under the third fair
use factor] have a qualitative, as well as quantitative, dimension. Even small takings can exceed fair use
when the essence of the work is taken.” (footnote omitted)).
155
See, e.g., § 107(3) (weighing “the amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted
work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (noting that the third fair use factor requires an analysis of both what was taken
quantitatively and qualitatively from the copyrighted work); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v.
Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the third fair use factor weighed in
favor of defendants because the use of screen shot from a video game constitutes the usurping of only a
tiny fraction of substance from the copyrighted work).
156
Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding that use of copyrighted Charlie Chaplin movies that may have been qualitatively, though not
quantitatively, great was sufficient to weigh the third factor against a finding of fair use).
157
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
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boundaries of those markets should be set. Some of the appropriate
boundaries are obvious: for example, few would argue in favor of largescale commercial pirating of movies and music. However, providing
appropriate protections to copyright holders should not extend to every
possible use of a work, especially where the use is not intended to be
commercialized and does not appreciably damage the copyright holder’s
bottom line.
The following case study considers in more detail the Star Wars:
Uncut project as an example of a creative crowdsourced derivative work. It
examines the social benefits inherent in the work and the current
uncertainties in ascertaining whether such works could be regarded as
infringing copyrights. We argue that copyright law as currently drafted and
enforced is unfortunately vague in its application to these kinds of projects.
We advocate the development of clearer guidelines that would facilitate
creative crowdsourcing in cases where the crowdsourced projects pose little
realistic threat of commercial harm to copyright holders.
It is important for the law to facilitate, rather than chill, creative
crowdsourced projects because these projects promote important social
goals and values. Much of what we say about Star Wars: Uncut will also
apply to creative remixes that do not involve crowdsourcing. The potential
to engage in expressive crowdsourcing of this kind, and on a global scale,
is only now beginning to be tapped. Those who engage in these kinds of
projects should be encouraged to communicate, collaborate, and play with
available technologies for expressive and self-actualization purposes.
D. Star Wars: Uncut: A Case Study in Crowdsourcing and Copyright
1. The Value of Creative Crowdsourcing.—In 2009, Casey Pugh, a
self-described “creative technolgist,”158 launched a project called Star
Wars: Uncut.159 His aim was to combine his passion for creative
crowdsourced technology with his passion for the Star Wars saga. The
project was relatively simple in its conception: Pugh broke down the first
released Star Wars film, Episode IV: A New Hope, into 473 individual
fifteen-second video segments.160 He then put out an open call on his
website for amateur filmmakers to choose a segment and film their own
version of it.161 The segments were then submitted to him and his team for
158

See CASEY PUGH, http://www.caseypugh.com [http://perma.cc/ZNS4-WV79].
Brian Stelter, An Emmy for Rebuilding a Galaxy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/arts/television/28uncut.html [http://perma.cc/PS8J-5WD4].
160
Id.
161
Casey Pugh et al.: Star Wars Uncut, AKSIOMA INST. FOR CONTEMP. ART,
http://www.aksioma.org/star.wars.uncut/ [http://perma.cc/VYE3-94X8] (“Described as ‘the biggest fan
remake of all time,’ Star Wars Uncut is a crazy fan [mash-up] remake of the original Star Wars movies.
In 2009, Casey was inspired to use the Internet and an ever-ready pool of passionate Star Wars fans to
159
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compilation into a full-length version of the original film told through the
eyes of the amateur filmmakers.162
There were no real rules about content other than that each
contribution had to be faithful to the storyboarding of the relevant
segment.163 This left individual contributors free to film cartoon versions,
stop-motion versions, low budget home video versions, computer generated
graphics versions, and even a few gender-bending versions of their
segments with storm-troopers appearing in the form of armored women.164
In one segment, a Jawa even appears in the guise of Homer Simpson.
Pugh ultimately collated the chosen contributions into a full-length
movie that he entitled Star Wars: Uncut. His film received significant
media attention, ultimately garnering an Emmy award.165 This award
established that a creative crowdsourced project could attain the status of a
feature film in its own right despite the fact that it was not intended for
commercial release. Pugh subsequently launched a similar project, for Star
Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back, at the Tribeca Film Festival in
April 2013.166
While creative crowdsourcing like Star Wars: Uncut bears some
structural similarity to more functional crowdsourcing (such as Wikipedia),
it provides quite different societal benefits. Functional crowdsourcing is
generally aimed at increasing the store of human knowledge, while creative
crowdsourcing applies the group mind in the artistic context to add to the
store of human expression. Both functional and creative crowdsourcing
enable individuals to communicate with each other across great distances
and to play with new technologies to create something novel that is larger
crowdsource the classic film Star Wars IV: A New Hope (1977). The original movie has been split in
480 scenes of [fifteen] seconds each, and Internet users and Star Wars fans have been invited to claim a
scene and to make a remake within [thirty] days. Each scene could be recreated in any possible way:
live action, homemade re-enactment, stop motion, flipbooks, action figures, 3D animation, animated
ASCII art, etc. Once all 480 scenes were claimed, all the scenes have been unlocked again so that more
people could participate. About a thousand fans from 300 countries all around the world took part in the
process, and all the scenes are available online on the project’s website and on YouTube.”).
162
Id.
163
Daniel Rubinton, Interview: Casey Pugh, “Star Wars Uncut,” FILM SOC’Y OF LINCOLN CENTER
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.filmlinc.com/daily/entry/interview-with-casey-pugh-star-wars-uncut
[http://perma.cc/QB9C-EE52] (“I told all the contributors to be as creative as possible when recreating
their scenes.”).
164
FAQ – Empire Uncut, STAR WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/faq
[http://perma.cc/6XF4-HGAC] (“You can re-create your scene however you want: live action, stop
motion, flipbooks, action figures . . . animated ASCII art, whatever! The more creative, the better.”).
165
Stelter, supra note 159.
166
See Empire Uncut, STAR WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/empire
[http://perma.cc/FE4Z-5DNA]; Karen Kemmerle, Casey Pugh on Star Wars Uncut, TRIBECA FILM
FESTIVAL (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.tribecafilmfestival.org/stories/casey-pugh-starwars-uncut
[http://perma.cc/G7MD-2672].

418

109:383 (2015)

Derivative Works 2.0

than any individual contribution. However, the values inherent in creative
crowdsourcing have more to do with self-expression than with exploring
new scientific or functional capabilities of the new technologies. Creative
crowdsourcing offers new opportunities for individuals to engage in
expression about popular culture. However, in order to draw from popular
culture, participants in creative crowdsourcing will likely run into some of
the copyright concerns described above.167
Creative crowdsourcing like Star Wars: Uncut provides opportunities
for society to experience aspects of popular culture in new ways. Remixes
and mash-ups are likely to contain new insights into their component
original works by way of parody, commentary, or the simple adding of new
perspectives. Remixing popular culture enables viewers to experience
myriad different artistic perspectives relating to an underlying work.
Segments involving female stormtroopers, for example, create a sense that
some viewers were disappointed in the lack of female presence in the story,
while segments that insert, say, Simpsons characters, suggest the potential
to laugh at aspects of the original film.
Crowdsourced remixes achieve this potential on a large scale,
incorporating many different voices by way of creative inputs.168 These
projects involve the opportunity to create new meanings and perspectives
on a work by juxtaposing different interpretations within a collective body.
The ability to express and experience views on matters of popular culture is
an important aspect of personhood. Individuals in a free society need space
to explore ideas about the cultural fabric surrounding them.169 People must
have the ability to access and use popular cultural icons for their own selfexpression as both consumers and creators.
The right of publicity is an area of law where commentators, courts,
and legislators have increasingly recognized the importance of access to
cultural icons. Commentators have identified conflicts between creative
play with cultural icons, on the one hand, and the protection of economic
intellectual property rights on the other.170 With respect to the theoretically
ambiguous right of publicity,171 for example, scholars have expressed
concern that if the right becomes too proprietary, it will negatively affect
167

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
169
See supra Part II.C.; see also Tushnet, supra note 15, at 655–58.
170
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 685–86 (“[F]andom demonstrates that unlimited economic incentives
to create in the form of expansive intellectual property protection are unnecessary to spur productivity
and may even inhibit it. Creative activity has inherent satisfactions; economic gain is not the only
motivation for creators. Purely market-oriented theories of copyright disregard the inherent power of
storytelling.”).
171
LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 43–45 (explaining the nature and genesis of the state right of
publicity tort).
168
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the ability of the public to engage in important speech about cultural
icons.172 Commentators have noted the complex relationship between
public icons and the public at large, noting that icons use the media and the
public to develop a commercially valuable persona.173 They have also
observed the absorption of public icons into the fabric of cultural discourse,
and the importance of individuals having ready access to those icons for
expressive purposes.174 The law governing the use of celebrity likenesses—
the right of publicity—has made dramatic strides in recent years to account
for the public interest in unauthorized and uncompensated transformative
use of such icons for expressive purposes.175 However, copyright has not
enjoyed such a dramatic evolution.176
Copyright law raises similar challenges in balancing incentives to
create allowances for expressive discourse. The more absolute control
afforded to content owners, the less popular material will be available for
creative play. However, allowing unbridled access to, and use of, protected
works potentially risks negatively impacting incentives to create in the first
place.177 Of course, even this discussion of balancing creative play against
commercial interests is an oversimplification on a number of levels. Many
who start out playing creatively with the raw materials of popular culture
end up making a living out of their work.178 However, the law currently
172

Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993) (“[P]ublicity rights exact a higher cost in important competing
values (notably, free expression and cultural pluralism) than has generally been appreciated.”); id. at
138 (“[P]ublicity rights facilitate private censorship of popular culture.”).
173
Id. at 193–94 (“However strenuously the star may fight the intertextuality of his image, however
scrupulously he may try to monitor and shape it, the media and the public always play a substantial part
in the image-making process. True, audiences cannot make media images mean anything they want to,
but they can (and do) select from the complexity of the image the meanings and feelings, the variations,
inflections and contradictions, that work for them. It is not just that the audience, by giving the public
figure cues as to what it is it wants from him, helps to determine the particular image he seeks to create
and project.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)).
174
Id. at 239 (“[P]roperty rights in our culture’s basic linguistic, symbolic, and discursive raw
materials should not be created unless a clear and convincing showing is made that very substantial
social interests will thereby be served. . . . [N]o such showing has yet been made with respect to star
images. The proponents of publicity rights still have work to do to persuade us why these images should
not be treated as part of our cultural commons, freely available for use in the creation of new cultural
meanings and social identities, as well as new economic values.”).
175
Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free
Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2013) (comparing the vast difference in expressive defenses
in copyright law versus in right of publicity law, especially as evidenced by the transformative use
defense developed for right of publicity claims in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)).
176
Id.
177
See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 15, at 490 (suggesting that the point of the fair use defense is to
protect uses that are not so excessive as to undermine the production of copyrighted works).
178
Lipton, supra note 108, at 983.
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does not sufficiently recognize the benefits of remixing, and, therefore, the
balancing of incentives is skewed too much in favor of copyright holders.
2. Copyright Infringement, Fair Use, and Star Wars: Uncut.—The
example of Star Wars: Uncut helps elucidate some of the challenges for
modern copyright law. One reason why Star Wars: Uncut is a useful case
study is that the copyright holder in question was originally Lucasfilm,
which had developed a sophisticated relationship with its fans in respect to
derivative fan works before being sold to Disney. The case study is useful
to this discussion because it is one of the most high profile examples of
creative crowdsourcing in popular arts and entertainment. Additionally, it
raises the specter of what may happen when corporate control of the
foundational work (the Star Wars films in this case) changes hands from a
company initially permissive about crowdsourced secondary works in
principle to a company that is historically more proprietary about its
valuable copyrighted properties. In other words, when Lucasfilm was sold
to Disney, there was some concern that the sale would negatively impact
the kinds of fan activities that had previously been tolerated, and even
encouraged, by Lucasfilm.179 Before its sale to Disney, Lucasfilm retained
tight control over the commercialization of its properties, but it also
encouraged fans to engage in noncommercial expressive activities using its
works.180 Historically, Lucasfilm made its own copyrighted materials
available to fans for noncommercial purposes,181 while retaining its rights to
license its property for authorized commercial purposes.182
Copyright law provided the backbone for these arrangements between
Lucasfilm and others because copyright in Lucasfilm’s works guided its
commercial and noncommercial licensing arrangements. However,
copyright law gave Lucasfilm the right to decide who received a license, on
what terms, and for what purposes. Copyright grants the property right that
Lucasfilm used in making these arrangements.183 The law gave Lucasfilm
the authority to decide at any time that it no longer wished to encourage or
179

Joe Mullin, Disney Owns Lucasfilm: Will It Have Room for Star Wars Fan Movies?, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/10/disney-ownslucasfilm-will-it-have-room-for-star-wars-fan-movies/ [http://perma.cc/M8BQ-PX7P].
180
Id. (“In 2007, Lucasfilm even released tools that would more easily enable remixing of Star
Wars content. A top Lucasfilm lawyer, Jeffrey Ulin, began speaking at conferences and to the media
about the value of fan mash-ups and remixes. Those works were ‘part of keeping the love of Star Wars
and the franchise alive. . . . We’re really trying to position ourselves for the next [thirty] years,’ Ulin
told the Wall Street Journal in 2007.” (alteration in original)).
181
Id.
182
See List of Star Wars Books, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Star_Wars_books
[http://perma.cc/T2TS-FMMY] (list of authorized Star Wars books).
183
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (copyright provides the owner of the work the exclusive rights to
control reproduction and distribution of their works, thus allowing a copyright owner to create express
and implied licenses).
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support noncommercial fan works, a right that Disney could now exercise
if it chose to put a stop to Casey Pugh’s work on The Empire Strikes Back
remix.
The fact that there has been a lot of consumer remixing of the Star
Wars movies to date does not mean that there has been no copyright
infringement. It simply means that Lucasfilm, and now Disney, has not
aggressively objected to the uses. Of course, an objection by a copyright
holder to a remix also does not mean the remix is in fact an infringing use.
The creators of the remix could potentially argue estoppel, waiver, license,
and fair use defenses. The problem is that there may be no way to know,
with any certainty, which uses are infringing under the current state of
copyright law, and the fair use doctrine in particular.
In the case of Star Wars: Uncut, Casey Pugh has commented that he
initially avoided getting in touch with someone at Lucasfilm because he
thought such a communication would be “difficult.”184 Subsequently, he
discovered that George Lucas himself was a fan of the project,185
particularly because of its noncommercial, fan-focused spirit.186
Nevertheless, this position is at the discretion of the copyright holder.
Another potential challenge for creative remixers is that remixes of
any kind will typically draw from several copyright sources. Thus, there are
more copyright holders who potentially could bring actions, which
increases the chilling effect on this kind of creative activity. Even where a
creative project is based on one work, like a movie, different copyright
concerns may arise in relation to different aspects of the work. As with Star
Wars: Uncut, the apparent ability for a remixer to use script, dialogue,
characters, or plotlines in a creative remix might not support an ability to
use the soundtrack: for example, if copyright in the soundtrack is held by
the composer separately from the other elements of the original film.
Would it be better, or even possible, for copyright law to create clearer
guidelines for when consumer remixes of protected content should not be
regarded as infringing? This question is not easy to answer. Because
copyright law is intended to encourage artistic innovation, one could argue
that ideally copyright law should support, for example, both the original
184

Coffin, supra note 100 (“I didn’t reach out to them initially because I knew getting in touch
would be very difficult. But I launched the project and [four] months later, I got a call and found out
that they were huge fans of the project and flew me out there to see if there were ways we could
collaborate in the future. They’ve always been huge supporters of it and it’s been great to have their
blessing.”).
185
Id.
186
Id. (“For me, this has always been an art project built by one person, rather than a commercial
project. So I think he appreciated that, the fact that this was an experiment and not some company
trying to take advantage. I’ve made no money from the project, but it’s just such an exciting ride for
me.”).
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Star Wars movies and Casey Pugh’s project. Copyright law should protect
the original movies against unauthorized copying as an incentive to create
those movies in the first place. It should also protect Pugh’s remix for the
same reasons. Both works are creative in nature, and both draw from the
fabric of popular culture. The original Star Wars movies utilize common
popular storylines, themes, characters,187 and, according to some
commentators, usurp specific copyrighted materials that arguably render
the movie itself an unauthorized derivative work.188 The protection afforded
the original movie assists Lucasfilm and Disney to propertize and
commercialize it, while any protection afforded to Pugh would encourage
artistic innovation in the fan community.
However, copyright law does not work that way. An unauthorized
derivative work such as Star Wars: Uncut cannot be made without
potentially infringing the derivative works right. The Copyright Act
provides that the maker of an unauthorized derivative work cannot herself
assert any copyright in the derivative work to the extent that it makes
unauthorized use of another’s work.189 Copyright law’s stance on derivative
works may seem unnecessarily draconian when applied to a
noncommercial project created for expressive purposes by fans (and rabid
consumers) of the original.
For the reasons discussed above, the fair use defense is unlikely to be
of much practical use to expressive consumers in these kinds of
situations.190 There is no upfront certainty for expressive consumers that a
fair use defense would succeed in any given case. In any event, many of
these consumers will not have the financial wherewithal to defend against
infringement litigation. When he started with Star Wars: Uncut, Casey
Pugh likely took the view that he was engaging in a noncommercial fair
use, but he was understandably hesitant about contacting Lucasfilm to
187

CHRISTOPHER VOGLER, THE WRITER’S JOURNEY: MYTHIC STRUCTURE FOR WRITERS 286–90
(3d ed. 2007) (analyzing the original movie as a paradigmatic example of the familiar “Hero’s Journey”
story structure from popular culture and mythology).
188
See, e.g., Charlie Jane Anders, Did George Lucas Copy Star Wars’ Opening Catchphrase from
an Ad in a Fashion Magazine?, IO9 (Dec. 26, 2012, 1:53 PM), http://io9.com/5971374/did-georgelucas-copy-star-wars-opening-crawl-from-an-ad-in-a-fashion-magazine [http://perma.cc/ZD9E-6BEE]
(wondering whether George Lucas lifted the opening catchphrase and sequence in Star Wars from a
1974 advertisement featured in Vogue); Kirby Ferguson, Everything Is a Remix Part 2 (Remix Inc.),
EVERYTHING IS A REMIX (Feb. 1, 2011), http://everythingisaremix.info/blog/everything-is-a-remix-part2 [http://perma.cc/G7E3-57WX] (detailing how George Lucas’s Star Wars itself draws on and
extensively borrows (without permission or payment) from the films of Akira Kurosawa, Flash Gordon,
John Wayne and spaghetti westerns, Leni Riefenstahl propaganda films, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, and
other works).
189
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes compilations and
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”).
190
See supra Part II.C.
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discuss it. Many other creators might not engage in such remixing activities
in the first place for fear of attracting copyright infringement liability.
Another problem with relying on fair use is the fact that large scale
consumer remixes such as Star Wars: Uncut may have a significant
commercial potential, unlike individual video mash-ups and more smallscale fan works. The recognition Star Wars: Uncut received in the media,
and by receiving an Emmy award, suggests a strong commercial potential.
Even if Pugh originally had no intentions to commercialize the work, what
would stop him from changing his mind once he realized he had a
potentially valuable commercial property on his hands? If he did decide to
release the work commercially, or use his website for profitable
advertising, or charge fees to access the work on his website, there is
nothing that could stop Disney from pursuing him under copyright law or
demanding royalties in relation to any profits he made. Many creative
activities that start out as purely expressive pursuits end up being
commercialized so this is not a minor concern.
In the past, copyright law has not squarely dealt with these kinds of
temporal problems—the idea that something that might initially qualify as
a fair use might later grow into commercial competition with the copyright
holder. In the next Part, we advance some suggestions for dealing with this
temporal issue. Our hope is that we may foster debate about the ways in
which copyright principles could be developed to provide more leeway for
creative remixing than currently exists while still protecting commercial
markets for copyright holders.
III. REFORMING COPYRIGHT AND FACILITATING REMIX
There are a number of ways copyright laws and policies might be
revised to strike a better balance between the commercial interests of
copyright holders and the expressive interests of individual and group
remixers. None of them are perfect, but some of them may well be more
effective than the current situation if the aim of the law is to foster and
maximize artistic innovation. Any new laws or policies will need to strike a
careful balance between a number of competing interests. It is not our hope
to definitively strike the appropriate balance with our suggestions; after all,
we recognize the limitations of our expertise and understand that there will
be no panacea to the problems we have identified with the current regime.
Rather, we aim to generate a discussion as to how a better balance may
ultimately be achieved. In particular, we advocate that law- and
policymakers should focus not only on the needs of copyright holders, but
also on the important contributions remixers make to society in terms of
self-expression, communication, collaboration, and self-actualization.
Our suggestions for reform include the following: (1) removal or
reworking of the strict liability basis for copyright infringement, at least in
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the case of noncommercial works; (2) tempering the size of statutory
damages or available criminal penalties for noncommercial or innocent
copyright infringement; (3) an “intermediate liability” proposal that gives
courts options other than finding infringement or fair use;191 (4) developing
clearer ex ante guidelines for fair use, particularly with respect to the
commercially driven factors one and four; and (5) removing
noncommercial remixing activities from the definition of “derivative
work.” Clearly any of these suggestions that change notions of fair use will
also somehow have to deal with the temporal issue of derivative works that
are not initially intended to be commercialized, but later achieve a
commercial potential. This problem should not be insurmountable in
practice. The more difficult issue will be whether there are any ways to
create fairer, more clearly delineated guidelines for what uses of
copyrighted works in the “transformative consumer use” area should be
exempted from infringement liability.
A. Reworking Strict Liability
Each of us has argued previously—and in more detail than this Article
will allow—that the strict liability basis for copyright law needs to be
revisited in the digital age.192 There are a number of reasons to revisit strict
liability for the Web 2.0 generation. Everything we do online involves
making digital copies of something—underlying code that represents
functionality (as in software) or content (as in digital music, movies,
images, and text).193 Thus a copyright regime that attaches strict liability to
any unauthorized copies places substantial power over our online lives in
the hands of powerful commercial content owners who often threaten
litigation first and negotiate later.194 Additionally, while everything online
involves copying, it is very difficult for Internet users to know when the

191

This proposal is based on the theory advanced in TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 155–66. More
detail can be found in that text. The theory is merely summarized infra Part III.C
192
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 142–43 (“[O]ne of the most inequitable and unbalanced aspects
of our copyright regime is its strong embrace of strict liability. There is no mens rea requirement in
copyright. Thus, everyone in the chain of supply can be held hostage to claims of infringement, a
particularly pernicious state of affairs in the digital era where works can pass through multiple agents
and contact points before getting to an end user. Moreover, in a networked world where we all violate
copyright law multiple times a day, the risk of penalties—even for innocent infringements—can be
staggering.”); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement,
13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 775–84 (2011) (questioning the appropriateness of strict liability to
copyright in the digital context).
193
See Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 290 (2009) (“[I]n cyberspace, the legal distribution
process requires consumer copying.”).
194
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 145 (describing a situation where record label EMI mistakenly
claimed copyright infringement against a website that was authorized to give away MP3 versions of its
copyrighted songs for free).
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copying is actually permissible and when it is not. This places the risks and
burdens of innocent infringement squarely on the shoulders of those
playing with technology for noncommercial purposes.195
The risks of copyright infringement are increased exponentially with
Web 2.0 technologies with respect to remix culture. As discussed above,
the whole point of remixing is to take what has gone before and build a
new kind of “collage” out of it to create or express something new.196 When
one considers the massive amount of copying in furtherance of creativity
and self-expression, and the meager likelihood that much of this activity
will cause any harm to copyright holders, one must at least begin to
question the need for strict liability, at least in this context.
Although the strict liability doctrine has clearly provided much
protection to copyright holders, it has also perhaps granted them more
power than their creations warrant, particularly when applied in a Web 2.0
culture. There are a number of potential solutions to this imbalance. One
option would be to remove strict liability from copyright law and put the
burden on copyright holders to establish that the alleged infringer intended
to infringe, at least for transformative uses of works (rather than for
outright piracy or bootlegging). Copyright holders would likely argue that
this would impose an unfair burden on them and that it would be very
difficult for them to prove the state of mind of an alleged defendant.
However, there are many torts and crimes that incorporate mens rea as an
element. There is no reason why a similar jurisprudence could not develop
in copyright.
Additionally, establishing a defendant’s state of mind in a copyright
infringement action may be easier in the digital world than it would have
been in the pre-digital era. People can, and frequently do, express their
intentions online with respect to use of a copyright work. A brief look at
YouTube shows that many individuals borrowing from copyrighted works
attach notices to their remixes indicating that they believe they are making
a fair use or that “no infringement was intended.”197
While, of course, these assertions in and of themselves do not mean
anything decisive in terms of the law, in context, they can speak to a
defendant’s best intentions, no matter how naive. Where someone posts a
homemade remix on YouTube for no commercial profit and attaches a “no
infringement” notice, the totality of the circumstances usually (though not
always) suggests the defendant intends no injury to the economic value of
195

Id. (“[I]t can be difficult for [Internet] users to ascertain whether a website truly has permission
to distribute the copyrighted work. Due to the strict liability nature of our copyright regime, users
frequently face unwitting infringement liability, a growing problem . . . .”); Snow, supra note 193.
196
See supra Part I.B.
197
Lipton, supra note 19, at 22–23.
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the original work, even if technically an infringement may have been
committed because of the current strict liability basis of copyright law. If
strict liability were removed from copyright law for strictly noncommercial
uses in such contexts, Internet users would have much greater leeway to
engage in creative play with segments of copyrighted works.
Another option to mitigate the harshness of the strict liability doctrine
in the expressive remixing context would be to adopt noncommercial
remixing as a defense to copyright infringement outside of the fair use
defense. Given the vagueness of fair use, it might make sense to create a
new defense for noncommercial digital copying that excuses the kinds of
activities described in this Article. The defense would cease to apply if the
defendant later attempted to commercialize the work in question. However,
it would remain in force as long as the defendant was not making an
unauthorized commercial profit from the plaintiff’s work. The other way of
achieving this kind of defense would be to develop a “noncommercial
remix defense” as an aspect of fair use. This could be done legislatively or
judicially and is discussed in more detail below.198
B. Tempering Remedies for Noncommercial Infringement
The potential deterrents for an innocent copyright infringer, or at least
a noncommercially motivated infringer, are very grave. Under the
Copyright Act, statutory damages may be available to plaintiffs far in
excess of the licensing fees they could otherwise recoup under a negotiated
agreement with defendants.199 Criminal charges have also been threatened
and imposed against individual copyright infringers.200 The likely
congressional intent behind the statutory damages regime in copyright law
is that it can be very difficult for copyright holders to establish actual
damages in some cases, and absent actual damages, potential infringers
would not face much of a deterrent effect.201 If defendants only have to pay
actual damages—often just the licensing fee they would otherwise have
paid had they negotiated with the copyright holder in the first place—there
will be little downside to infringing.202

198

See infra Part III.B.
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 147 (noting the imposition of statutory damages deters
defendants by imposing punishment over and above the licensing fees they would have had to pay if
they had negotiated with the plaintiff).
200
Id. at 150–51 (noting several cases of criminal charges being brought against individuals for
activities that probably did not cause much in the way of commercial harm to copyright holders); see
also Lipton, supra note 19, at 38–42 (observing the imposition of criminal charges for an unauthorized
video of a small segment of the movie The Twilight Saga: New Moon).
201
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 147.
202
Id. (“[W]ithout the availability of statutory damages, one could not adequately dissuade
infringement. Absent some form of statutory or punitive damages, potential infringers would usurp the
199
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Although there may be good reason for the existence of statutory
damages, their current design (both in terms of their expansive range and
the way they are imposed203) creates significant problems. Existing law
allows plaintiffs who have timely registered their works to recover up to
$150,000 in statutory damages per act of willful infringement (plus
recovery of attorneys’ fees). Such a policy might make sense when seeking
to deter pirates and bootleggers. But it makes no sense to use the same
blunt instrument to squelch transformative activity that promotes progress
in the arts. In addition, bootlegging can both be difficult to catch and
require heavy deterrence. Neither of these rationales exists for
transformative works.
To wit, under current law, artists such as the Beastie Boys and Biz
Markie are treated as little different from the pirates of Napster, Grokster,
and Megaupload. For example, with its more than one hundred samples,
Paul’s Boutique could create $7.5 million in potential liability for the
Beastie Boys if just half of the samples are not deemed “fair use.”204 A
mash-up that makes use of several songs can quickly rack up millions of
dollars in liability—even if the mash-up is noncommercial in nature, causes
no cognizable actual damages, and generates no revenues whatsoever. This
is the potential liability that any artist faces if she is on the wrong side of
the “fair use” Rubicon.
Judicial rulings over the past two decades have caused copyright’s
Sword of Damocles, through massive statutory damages, to precariously
hang over the heads of would-be sampling and remixing artists and, in turn,
works of others with impunity, knowing that, in a worst case scenario, they may only have to pay the
licensing fee they should have paid at the outset.”).
203
The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment requires that statutory damages
awards remain within the province of juries. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340 (1998). This creates numerous problems. Among other things, there is little precedent and few
parameters to guide juries, who do not have the luxury or ability to sift through prior case law. As such,
award assessments can be wildly disparate under similar fact patterns, raising potential due process
concerns. Meanwhile, significant statutory damage awards regularly issue in cases with thin-tononexistent evidence of actual damages. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad.
of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (awarding
$31.68 million in statutory damages for copyright infringement in the absence of any evidence of actual
damages); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (imposing a
$275,000 statutory damages award in the absence of any evidence of actual damages), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Nate Anderson, Thomas Verdict: Willful
Infringement, $1.92 Million Penalty, ARS TECHNICA (June 18, 2009, 4:32 PM EST),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/06/jammie-thomas-retrial-verdict/
[http://perma.cc/53RHX3CL] (noting the assessment of a $1.92 million statutory damages award in a peer-to-peer file sharing
case where the trial judge recognized that the actual damages were approximately $50).
204
Courts can award statutory damages of up to $150,000 per act of willful infringement. See
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). So, if a court found the Beastie Boys liable for maximum statutory
damages penalties for just half (50) of the samples used on Paul’s Boutique, the record could result in
$7.5 million in infringement liability.
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have fundamentally changed the type of creative output the public can and
does enjoy. The threat of enormous statutory damages results in
overdeterrence of potentially lawful, and clearly beneficial, future content
creation.
Many artists facing copyright’s statutory damages regime have elected
to eschew sampling, mash-ups, or any other type of transformative activity
altogether. Even when someone who makes use of a copyrighted work has
a good chance at a successful fair use defense, the terrifying consequences
of being wrong will lead rational actors to get a license—even where the
law does not require one. As a result, millions of dollars are spent every
year to obtain licenses for works that are in the public domain or otherwise
do not require a license to use.205 This permission culture stifles legitimate
artistic activities rather than promoting the arts.
These problems with the current statutory damages regime have been
exacerbated with the emergence of the Web 2.0 remix culture and with
crowdsourcing production in particular. Even if a copyright holder were
willing to license the work for these purposes, chances are that copyright
holders would seek royalties that remixers could not afford. Because most
remixers are not intending to commercialize their work, they are unlikely to
be in a position to pay royalties purely for the purpose of engaging in
expressive remixing. Even if some remixers could pay, the imposition of
royalties would create a two-tiered system of creativity: wealthy
individuals who could afford royalties could engage in creative remixing,
whereas those lacking the financial wherewithal to pay royalties would not
have the same access to building blocks of cultural expression.
Because negotiating licenses in the remix context is generally not
realistic, imposing damages in excess of a standard licensing fee is even
less realistic. When one is not talking about commercial uses of valuable
intellectual property, conceiving of damages and penalties in terms of
commerce makes little practical sense. It is also likely to be the case that
whatever penalties are imposed, many expressive remixers will be unable
to pay them. Thus, many people who want to be creative with elements of
popular culture have the choice of potentially going bankrupt or deciding
not to engage in the creative expression in the first place.
Again, one might argue that copyright holders would never sue those
who are not intending to make commercial profits from unauthorized uses
of protected works. But recent history has demonstrated that this is not the
case. Copyright holders have brought a significant volume of litigation
against private individuals who have infringed copyrights. This has played
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See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1030 (2006); John Tehranian,
Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 1003–04 (2012).
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out most notably in the peer-to-peer file-sharing scenario.206 However,
infringement litigation has also been threatened—and takedown notices
issued—with respect to poor-quality home videos on YouTube that
incorporate snippets of copyrighted material.207
Removing or minimizing statutory damages and criminal penalties for
noncommercial copyright infringements may be a step in the right
direction. Judges would have more leeway to award insubstantial or de
minimis damages for noncommercial infringements. However, to avoid
chilling expression and bringing private individuals into court on copyright
infringement suits, it may be better to find a way for expressive
noncommercial conduct to be regarded as noninfringing. Thus, perhaps a
reworking or clarifying of the fair use defense to exempt noncommercial
remixing activities would be a better option.208
Another limitation to focusing on the tempering of damages is that
many individuals are likely deterred from using copyrighted materials for
fear of litigation itself, as opposed to fear of the kinds of damages or
penalties that are currently available. As a result, altering the basis for
awarding damages or criminal penalties may not have sufficient practical
impact on individual Internet users. Those who do not think they will be
caught and sued will proceed with their activities regardless of awareness
of potential damages, and those whose expression is currently chilled
would continue to be deterred even if penalties were lessened for
noncommercial infringement.
C. An Intermediate Liability Approach209
One of the problems with the current copyright regime is its binary
approach to infringement—either an activity is an infringement attracting
potentially significant penalties or it is not an infringement, attracting no
penalties.210 This “zero-sum” approach is standing in the way of courts’
abilities to effectively balance First Amendment concerns and the
promotion of individual self-expression against intellectual property
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TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 149 (noting that thousands of actions have been commenced by
the RIAA and its members against individual file-sharers).
207
Id. at 135–36.
208
See infra Part III.D.
209
Portions of Part III.B–C come from Khanna & Tehranian, supra note 22.
210
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 155 (“The statutory scheme of the present regime forces courts
to choose between two extreme options: infringement or fair use. If courts find infringement, hefty
statutory damages often ensue . . . that are often well in excess of actual damages. However, if courts
find fair use, an unauthorized user of a copyrighted work is able to exploit (without permission or
payment) the work of another with impunity, thereby free riding on the creative success of the original
author.”).
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protection.211 This problem could be mitigated by the development of an
“intermediate liability” approach under which a transformative or
productive use of a copyrighted work that would otherwise be an
unauthorized derivative work would be exempt from statutory or actual
damages.212
We propose a “transformative use” defense that could be argued by a
defendant in the alternative to a fair use defense.213 Whereas the fair use
defense would exempt the defendant completely from liability,214 the
transformative use defense would result in an exemption from actual and
statutory damages as well as injunctive relief.215 However, it would require
the defendant to evenly divide any profits made from the infringing work
with the plaintiff.216
The transformative use defense would only be available to defendants
who had registered their work with the Copyright Office.217 The Copyright
Office should issue guidelines to provide some ex ante guidance on the
kinds of uses likely to qualify as transformative uses.218 Transformative
uses, at a minimum, would include parody, satire, digital sampling, and
appropriationist modern art.219 The kinds of remixes under consideration in
this Article, particularly large crowdsourced projects, would fall under the
category of appropriationist modern art. Appropriationist modern art makes
use of preexisting works, especially those laden with cultural significance
or meaning, by recontextualizing them, often with just slight alterations, for
expressive purposes.
211

Id.
Id. at 155–56.
213
Id. at 156 (“Under the intermediate liability alternative, a court would first determine whether a
work is infringing. If the work infringes, a defendant could proffer two defenses—fair use and
transformative use.”).
214
Id. (“The fair use defense would continue to function as it currently does, providing immunity
from liability for individuals meeting the four-part balancing test delineated in section 107 of the
Copyright Act.”).
215
Id. at 157 (“For all such transformative uses . . . intermediate liability would attach. The
resulting transformative use would be exempt from actual and statutory damages as well as injunctive
relief.”).
216
Id. (“By default . . . the original author of the copyrighted work and the transformative user of
that work would evenly divide all profits resulting from the commercial exploitation of the
transformative work.”).
217
Id. at 156 (showing that in order to qualify as a transformative use, the defendant “must have
properly registered their work as a transformative use with the Copyright Office”).
218
Id. (“[T]he Copyright Office would issue guidelines that define certain categories of use as
transformative, thereby providing ex ante guidance on what constitutes transformative use.”).
219
Id. (“Under this new intermediate liability option, transformative uses would include . . .
parody, satire, digital sampling, and appropriationist modern art, as each of these activities draws upon
copyrighted works to create a new work of art imbued with new expressions that criticize or illuminate
our values, assess our social institutions, satirize current events, or comment on our most notorious
cultural symbols.”).
212
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The intermediate liability proposal is attractive on a number of levels.
It provides the ex ante guidance on acceptable uses of copyrighted works
that is currently missing from the fair use defense. It allows the creators of
transformative works to continue to engage in their expressive activities,
while requiring them to share any commercial profits made with the
original copyright holder. This mitigates any chilling effect that might
currently be felt under a regime that potentially imposes significant
monetary damages and that gives little upfront guidance to expressive
remixers about acceptable uses of others’ work. Additionally, if
transformative users do not make any commercial profits from the
transformative use, they will not be required to pay the copyright holder
anything.220 Although the transformative use defense itself could only be
fully determined in the litigation context (as with fair use), the guidelines
for transformative use would give a better idea of the likely outcome of
litigation than if the defendant had to rely solely on fair use.
Defenders of copyright’s status quo might attack this intermediate
liability solution as unprecedented. However, there is important prior
experience to support its viability. Specifically, the so-called compulsory
mechanical license provision of the Copyright Act is similar to the
intermediate liability solution and is already in operation. It illustrates the
tremendous benefits that both content industries and the public can make
with new uses of the copyrighted works of others without permission but
with payment. It also has functioned remarkably well for more than a
century.
Copyright law generally provides creators of an original work with a
series of exclusive rights, including the rights to reproduce, publicly
distribute, and create derivatives of the work. However, since 1909,
musical compositions (and only musical compositions) have enjoyed an
exception to this rule. The reason for this exemption relates to a now longdefunct technology—the player piano.221 But, the exemption remains alive
220

Id. at 157–58 (“Most importantly, noncommercial users would be free to appropriate
copyrighted works for transformative purposes without compensation. Thus, the proposed regime
unburdens precisely the type of speech that has historically received the greatest protection under First
Amendment jurisprudence—noncommercial expression.”).
221
In 1908, the Supreme Court determined that perforated rolls of music used with player pianos
did not constitute copies subject to the exclusive rights secured under the Copyright Act. See WhiteSmith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). Because the rolls were only machinereadable (i.e., they could not be read as musical compositions by even those skilled in the arts and were
therefore not intelligible to humans—a requirement of the term “copies”), the Court reasoned that “we
cannot think that they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.” Id. In response to the ruling,
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909, which held that piano rolls created from underlying
musical compositions constituted unauthorized reproductions of those compositions. Copyright Act of
1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075. The Copyright Act of 1909 simultaneously granted those who
wished to manufacture and distribute mechanical embodiments of musical compositions a compulsory
license (known as the compulsory mechanical license) under certain conditions. Id. § 25(e).
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today. Under the exemption, anyone can record a “cover” version of a
copyrighted, nondramatic musical composition and distribute copies of it
without the permission of the original composer.222 Thus, without any
authorization from the original artist, Johnny Cash can record a hauntingly
frail acoustic version of Nine Inch Nails’s more muscular and menacing
“Hurt”; Luna a dreamy, lo-fi cover of Guns N’ Roses’s “Sweet Child O’
Mine”; William Shatner a loungy take on Pulp’s alternative rock classic
“Common People”; and Dynamite Hack an acoustic folk-rock rendition of
NWA member Eazy-E’s gangsta rap “Boyz-N-the-Hood.” As the history of
modern music has demonstrated, the public, artists, and the industry have
thrived as a result of the availability of the compulsory mechanical
license.223 The cover song exemption has spawned innovation and
transformation in music, and the intermediate liability proposal would do
the same in other areas of the arts.
Admittedly, however, the intermediate liability proposal does have a
few potential shortcomings. The codification and potential explanation of
the notion of transformative use potentially erodes a copyright holder’s
derivative works right.224 One solution to the inherent conflict between
facilitating transformative use and protecting a copyright holder’s
derivative works right would be to expressly exempt certain uses of a

222

17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). Instead, cover artists need only provide notice of their intention to
record a cover song and then make payment of a fixed per-album fee to the copyright owner. Id.
§ 115(b)–(c). Although fully transformative uses of musical compositions cannot be made under the
statute, cover artists are free to tinker with the composition to adapt it to a particular musical genre: “A
compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved . . . .” Id.
§ 115(a)(2).
223
See, e.g., Kenneth M. Achenbach, Grey Area: How Recent Developments in Digital Music
Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory Licensing for Sample-Based Works,
6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 187, 209–11 (2004) (noting the benefit of the cover song right to the music
industry and upstart and established artists alike). For example, although Bob Dylan is a remarkable
songwriter and musician, there are few who would consider his rendition of “All Along the
Watchtower”—a song he both composed and recorded—superior to the cover of this song by Jimi
Hendrix. Hendrix’s version of “All Along the Watchtower” helped launch him into rock’s pantheon, but
it also secured the place of Dylan’s composition in rock history. The availability of the compulsory
mechanical license therefore enabled Hendrix to expand his popularity and introduced a whole new
audience to the works of both Dylan and Hendrix. Without this exemption from liability, however, the
world would have never enjoyed these cherished contributions to rock history. This “free” (rather than
“permission”) culture has allowed the creation of over 500 different covers of the song, all paying Bob
Dylan royalties.
224
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 159 (“Adoption of an intermediate liability scheme would
inextricably necessitate a reexamination of the derivative rights doctrine. . . . [T]he creation and
dissemination of transformative works advances the constitutional goal of progress in the arts.
However, the broad exclusive right of copyright owners to prepare derivative works has swallowed up
the ability of transformative users to escape infringement liability, thereby undermining the key goal of
the federal copyright regime.” (footnote omitted)).
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copyright work from the derivative works right.225 Certain noncommercial
and largely expressive works could be allowed to exist outside the
derivative works doctrine, despite drawing on original works to create
something new.
Although creating exemptions from the derivative works rights sounds
like simply creating the intermediate liability regime in practice, the
difference is that exempting certain works from the exclusive right would
avoid infringement in the first place. The intermediate liability solution, on
the other hand, is a defense to an infringement. The option of reworking the
notion of a derivative work to exempt noncommercial remixing is taken up
in more detail below.226
Another potential shortcoming with the intermediate liability proposal
as applied to expressive remixing relates to the requirement that
transformative works should be registered with the Copyright Office as a
prerequisite to raising the transformative use defense.227 Many remixers
will not have the time, knowledge, or ability to register their works with the
Copyright Office. In most cases, remixing is a hobby with which people
engage during their spare time. Hobby remixers are unlikely to want to take
the time and effort of registering every single creative remix they make
with the Copyright Office. This would be an extremely time-consuming
enterprise, and would be ultimately unrewarding in many cases given that
there is often no way of knowing upfront which copyright holders are
likely to bring infringement actions against remixers.
Additionally, in cases where remixes are crowdsourced and many
people have grouped together to create the transformative work, it may be
unclear who is most appropriately regarded as the author or owner of the
work. This confusion would also make registration difficult in practice,
particularly if more than one participant in a crowdsourced remix sought to
assert ownership rights. The registration requirement would work most
effectively in cases such as the Star Wars: Uncut scenario, where a largescale crowdsourced transformative work is effectively organized and
ultimately created by one central “author.” In this scenario, the identity of
the author is relatively clear despite the contributions by multiple
filmmakers.
There are clearly situations in which the intermediate liability
approach would promote creative innovation both in terms of the creation
of original works and in the subsequent creation of transformative
derivative works. However, we recognize that there would still be many
situations in which transformative works would not be registered and
225
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where any infringement litigation could result in damages that would not be
commensurate with the harm actually suffered by the copyright holder.
Another challenge for intermediate liability would arise in cases in
which a remixer borrowed from a number of different copyright sources.
Where the remix is based on one original work, it would be a fairly simple
matter to arrange a profit-sharing mechanism between the plaintiff and
defendant. For example, Star Wars: Uncut would be a good candidate for
this kind of arrangement if it were commercialized. The profits might be
shared between Pugh and Disney, and Pugh could also share profits with
individual contributors to his project. The adoption of an intermediate
liability scheme would encourage organizers of creative crowdsourcing
projects to negotiate upfront with contributors for their appropriate share of
any resulting profits.
However, in situations involving more collage-style remixes that draw
from multiple different sources, courts would have more trouble in
determining how profit-sharing arrangements should work. Should all
potential plaintiffs be required to participate in the same litigation so that
one court could create a profit-sharing order that covers all interested
parties? If not, a second copyright holder who sues a remixer after the first
copyright holder has already secured half the profits may be relegated to
only a quarter of the profits made by the transformative user. To be
effective in these circumstances, an intermediate liability proposal may
need to include a mechanism for second copyright holders to obtain a fairer
share.
None of these profit-sharing problems arise in situations in which the
remixer has not made any commercial use of the transformative work,228
and this will probably be the case in many situations of expressive
remixing. In sum, the intermediate liability proposal has promise, and could
be developed in a way that promotes expressive use of protected works.
However, at least in the context of expressive remixing, lawmakers would
have to deal with issues of multiple defendants and multiple plaintiffs to
make the option truly workable. Additionally, lawmakers should consider
the necessity of the registration requirement for transformative works. At
the very least, any intermediate liability scheme ultimately adopted might
allow defendants to register their transformative works after the
commencement of infringement proceedings against them.
The intermediate liability proposal recognizes the cost of copyright
infringement to the creative industries and the need to combat its pernicious
effects. As a result, it does nothing to undermine the ability of content
creators to enforce their legitimate rights against those who make
228

Id. at 157 (noting that in the cases of noncommercial transformative uses, no compensation
would be payable to a copyright holder under the intermediate liability regime).

435

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

wholesale copies of their works without permission. Under the plan,
copyright holders can still vigorously pursue pirates with hefty statutory
damages and the possibility of criminal sanctions. But enterprising artists
would be protected from the same blunt weapons wielded against pirate
enterprises.
The impact of the intermediate liability solution upon transformative
users and the licensing market for copyrighted content would be quite
profound. The proposal would advance the constitutionally mandated goals
of the copyright system by stimulating more artistic creation and wealth
generation for new content and sampled content alike. Specifically, small
and emerging DJ’s, rappers, and hip–hop artists could sample from major
recordings without the threat of litigation. More established artists like U2,
Beck, and Eminem would see the costs of sampling for their future works
driven down in a competitive marketplace. Rights holders could no longer
refuse to allow any uses of their content or to hold out for obscenely high
licensing rates. The gains would be felt throughout the arts, from
documentary directors (who would no longer face exorbitant rates in order
to sample a few seconds of a film clip), to appropriationist artists and their
exhibiting galleries (who would no longer fear massive liability for creating
and exhibiting art that borrows cultural symbols or other preexisting
works), to crowdsourcers who may currently fear the threat of an
infringement action.
Under our proposal, negotiations between artists would be informed
by the fact that transformative users can always make use of underlying
materials, even if they do not reach a deal with rights holders—so long as
they account for those rights holders through a payment of a portion of
their realized profits. Beyond the world of music, artists of all stripes would
enjoy the right to create using underlying source materials without fear that
they will face millions of dollars in legal liability or, worse yet, find the
FBI raiding their house in the middle of the night.229
Parties would be free to contract around default damages rules for
transformative uses. But the proposed intermediate liability scheme helps
set a reasonable starting point for negotiations between the original
copyright owner(s) and the transformative user and it prevents the
ambiguity of the fair use defense and the in terrorem effect of copyright’s
statutory damages regime from deterring valuable artistic activity. It also
prevents original copyright owners from discriminating between favorable
and unfavorable transformative uses of their copyrighted works. In short, in
229
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practice, the intermediate liability proposal would ensure that parties
negotiate for more reasonable rates on royalties.
Existing content owners whose works are sampled will also reap
economic benefits by sharing in the profits stemming from transformative
works, many of which would never have existed otherwise. New listeners
may also be attracted to older content when they find out that it has been
sampled. As an example, DJ Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album, mashing up
The Beatles’ The White Album and Jay-Z’s The Black Album, likely served
as a music discovery tool for those who may not have been Beatles or JayZ fans before.230 Admittedly, it is possible that some artists who receive
windfall benefits under the current regime would receive less money under
this proposed system. But for policymakers, concerns about promotion of
progress in the useful arts—rather than enrichment of a very few in
perpetuity—should drive the framing of copyright law. And the
intermediate liability solution recognizes that law should enable the
unfettered functioning of the creative marketplace, not inhibit it.
D. Clarifying Fair Use
A corollary to the intermediate liability regime described above231
would be simply to streamline the contours of the fair use defense. As
discussed above, fair use is notoriously unpredictable, which significantly
hinders its putative purpose of protecting the rights of consumers and users
to access copyrighted works.232 Consider a few high-profile examples from
the past few decades. Whereas Biz Markie was hit with liability (and a
referral to the district attorney’s office for potential jail time) for sampling
several bars of a piano line from Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again
(Naturally),”233 the Beastie Boys escaped liability when they sampled a sixsecond riff from jazz flutist James Newton.234 The writer of an unauthorized
take on Gone with the Wind (told from the perspective of the slaves) won
230
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the right—under the fair use doctrine—to publish her work over the
objections of the Margaret Mitchell Estate,235 whereas the writer of an
unauthorized send-up of Catcher in the Rye (in which an elderly Holden
Caulfield confronts author J.D. Salinger) was deemed to be infringing and
had his book effectively banned in the United States.236 Appropriationist
artist Jeff Koons has experienced the fair use doctrine’s inexplicable
vacillation first hand. He has had federal appellate courts weigh in on two
infringement suits for his unauthorized use of source materials in his art. In
the first case, a court denied his fair use defense and found him liable.237
The court even ordered him to pay fees to the plaintiff.238 In the second
case, a court found his work transformative and, therefore, excused him
from liability under the fair use doctrine (though the court declined to
award him his fees).239 All told, there is little consistency in the way courts
weigh the various factors dictated by statute.
Wildly disparate outcomes on similar fact patterns have resulted,
making copyright cases difficult to decipher. For example, as Rebecca
Tushnet has pointed out, “After decades of litigation, it is still difficult to
tell when and whether one can photocopy copyrighted materials, even for
scientific research.”240 As we have seen with musicians, nebulous fair use
standards have prompted self-censorship in the creative process. Potential
“infringers” are, understandably, unwilling and unable to bear the
substantial costs of litigation and liability even where it does not or should
not exist.
Commentators in recent years have made several proposals about
reworking the operation of the fair use defense to give users of copyright
works clearer ex ante guidance about whether their uses may be found to be
infringing.241 Creating executive guidelines, via the Copyright Office,
regarding what uses are the most likely to be considered fair use would be
helpful and would serve much the same purpose as the guidelines
contemplated in the intermediate liability proposal.242 In fact, in recent
years, some public interest groups have attempted to create best practice
235
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guidelines for fair use in particular contexts such as for the documentary
film industry.243
Increased awareness of the nature of fair use and more presumptions in
favor of regarding particular classes of uses as fair use would go a long
way towards striking a more appropriate balance between free speech and
proprietary copyrights. An advantage of this approach over the
intermediate liability approach is that it would not necessarily require
legislative reform, but rather the development of executive guidelines more
clearly explaining fair use. Legislative clarification of § 107 of the
Copyright Act is another possible solution. Some countries have more
clearly delineated legislative notions of fair dealing, which are exempted
from copyright infringement liability.244 There is no reason why American
legislation could not also be more specific in this regard.
Another advantage of this approach is that asserting a fair use would
not require registration of a work as a fair use. Of course, the intermediate
liability proposal could also be revised to remove the registration
requirement for transformative works, or to allow more flexibility in terms
of when a transformative work is required to be registered.245
The most significant difference between clarifying the contours of fair
use and adopting an intermediate liability regime would be that fair use is a
complete defense to infringement, whereas the intermediate liability regime
requires profit sharing between a plaintiff and a defendant.246 In this regard,
the intermediate liability proposal may result in fairer outcomes than a
clarified fair use doctrine, and could serve as a basis for legislative
compromise with content holders, who will understandably be loath to give
up existing rights without getting anything in return. The problem with the
current situation is that courts have to choose between two extreme options:
infringement that can result in exorbitant damages or fair use that results in
none.247 Clarifying the contours of fair use does not create the potential
middle ground that the intermediate liability approach could provide.
Creating greater guidance about the contours of fair use in the digital
age is an important goal and one that should be pursued in any event, given
the strict liability basis of copyright and the fact that digital technologies
rely on copying as the basis of all functionality. However, reformulating
the contours of fair use may not in and of itself provide appropriately
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tailored solutions to all of the challenges to copyright law posed by
expressive remixing.
E. Tempering the Derivative Works Right
Many of the proposals described in the previous sections are, to a
greater or lesser extent, arguably inconsistent with the derivative works
right currently reserved to copyright holders. This is nothing new. As we
explained in the Introduction, the existing statutory language of the
derivative rights doctrine has always existed in tension with the modern fair
use balancing test. Under §§ 101 and 106(2) of the Copyright Act,
copyright holders enjoy the exclusive right to create and disseminate works
based on their original works, including prequels and sequels, translations,
and adaptations. Moreover, unless the new work is deemed to be a fair use,
the creator of an unlawful derivative work is not entitled to assert any
copyright in that work to the degree that it makes impermissible use of
another’s copyrighted work.248
To the extent that our proposals would grant the creators of derivative
works greater leeway to create and use those works without fear of
infringement liability, or at least without fear of significant penalties, these
proposals are inconsistent with the derivative works right. But that is the
point: it is time to reexamine the contours of the derivative works right.
Just as the vague contours of the fair use defense have stifled free speech,249
the expansive notion of derivative works has also squelched expressive
activities.250
Commentators have suggested that the derivative works right (and the
transformative use aspect of the first fair use factor with which it is in
tension) should be reworked in order to further the important goals of
artistic innovation and personal expression.251 It would certainly be possible
for Congress to more clearly delineate and streamline the definition of
derivative works to effectively exempt certain classes of works from
infringing the derivative works right. While we here suggest that expressive

248

17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (“The subject matter of copyright . . . includes compilations and
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”).
249
See supra Part II.C.
250
TEHRANIAN, supra note 112, at 160 (“As copyright law historically evolved from the narrow
right to forbid duplication of one’s original work to a broader right to interdict . . . any borrowing of the
elusive intellectual essence of one’s original work, an artificial hierarchy of works emerged to
rationalize the expansion of an author’s property right. . . . This unchallenged hierarchy . . . begs
reconsideration on two important grounds: the important role of transformative use in the advancement
of the arts, and the value of transformative use on expressive grounds.”).
251
See, e.g., id., at 160–61; Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
1213, 1267–68 (1997).

440

109:383 (2015)

Derivative Works 2.0

remixes could be exempted from the definition of derivative works, others
have suggested a broader approach.252
Naomi Voegtli, for example, has suggested that the definition of
derivative works could be fine-tuned to contemplate only: (1) works that
exhibit little originality in their own right; (2) works that unduly encroach
on the economic prospects of the source work(s); and (3) basic translations,
recordings, art reproductions, abridgements, and condensations of source
work(s).253 In other words, her approach would exempt transformative
works from the notion of derivative works, thus reducing any potential
conflict between the intermediate liability proposal suggested above and
the derivative works right.254 Such an approach to derivative works would
also lessen any tension between the derivative works right and a
streamlined notion of fair use as suggested above.255
Voegtli’s approach would effectively reserve to copyright holders
limited markets we might deem them exclusively entitled to exploit,
including perhaps markets for translations, recordings, and art
reproductions.256 But, by the same token, it would open new expressive
opportunities for those who wanted to engage in expressive uses of existing
works in a manner that would not clearly impact the basic market for those
existing works and would not otherwise diminish a copyright holder’s
reasonable right to exploit her work commercially. This approach would
work well in the case of expressive remixes like Star Wars: Uncut. Even if
Pugh were to commercialize his work, it would not likely encroach on any
realistic market that Disney may want to exploit. In fact, it may help
Disney in light of Disney’s plans to release new sequels to the original Star
Wars films by creating a buzz around the storylines that immediately
precede those in the new films.257
In any event, a more streamlined definition of derivative works might
exempt such a project from liability as an infringing derivative work. The
252
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same result would be achieved under a narrower approach that would
simply exempt expressive remixing from the scope of the derivative works
right. Whether one prefers a general reworking of the definition of
derivative works, such as that suggested by Voegtli, or a sector-specific
exemption for particular classes of works, the resulting balance between
proprietary copyrights and free expression would represent a significant
improvement over the current situation.
Either form of reworking the derivative works definition could take
place as a stand-alone reform effort or as part of a package that includes
streamlining fair use or adopting an intermediate liability regime. Now is a
particularly good time to consider these proposals in light of the House
Judiciary Committee’s ongoing review of American copyright law.258 In
this vein, it is important to understand that the proposals suggested in this
Part are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One could explore all of them
at the same time or focus on one or more of them. We suggest that even
outside the context of expressive remixing, there is merit to rethinking
copyright damages and strict liability, and to refining fair use and the
definition of derivative works. We also advocate the development of
compromise regimes such as the intermediate liability proposal described
above to avoid the “all or nothing” basis for copyright infringement that
exists under current law.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the digital age, and particularly the exponential
development of interactive Web 2.0 technologies, has created dramatic new
challenges for copyright law. Because all online activities involve copying
to some degree, the strict liability basis of copyright law raises a potential
clash between technological innovation and free expression on the one
hand, and proprietary copyrights on the other. Digital consumer service
providers such as Apple and Sony may encourage us to use their
technologies to explore digital creation, but content industries reserve the
right to sue if we use the fabric of popular culture for our own creative
purposes. Litigation against private individuals is a reality, and penalties
for infringement can be extreme.259
We have focused our discussion on the particular expressive outlet of
digital remixing that borrows from the copyrighted works of others. We
have used creative crowdsourcing as a case study to emphasize the ways in
which current laws fall short of striking an appropriate balance between
fostering innovation in original works and enabling subsequent expression
employing those works as building blocks. However, the implications of
258
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our concerns resonate further, applying to a wide range of activities from
fan fiction and expressionist art to various musical genres such as hip–hop
and electronica.
Our goal has been to identify current imbalances in the law between
the rights of copyright holders and the rights of users of copyright works,
and to suggest ways in which a more appropriate balance could be
developed. To this end, we have put forward a number of proposals,
namely: revisiting the strict liability basis of copyright, rethinking the
current statutory damages regime, creating a workable intermediate liability
proposal to provide a middle ground between liability and fair use,
streamlining fair use, and fine-tuning the derivative works doctrine.
Each of our suggestions raises challenges for lawmakers, and each
comes with inherent advantages and disadvantages. Some of these
proposals may work particularly well together, such as reworking the
definition of derivative works and adopting an intermediate liability regime
for transformative works. Others may operate well on their own, such as
revisiting the nature of copyright damages.
Our aim in making these suggestions for reform is not to assert that
one or more of them would necessarily be preferable to the others. Instead,
we believe that any of them has the potential to strike a better balance than
the current copyright regime. Presumably, one of the tasks of those
reviewing American copyright law under the House Judiciary Committee’s
plan will be to consider the balance between existing copyrights and
downstream creative efforts in today’s interactive digital world. It is our
hope that the suggestions made in this Article will assist lawmakers in
thinking seriously about reforms to copyright law that will better promote
artistic innovation in transformative works and free expression more
generally. Otherwise, the law will continue to preserve and perpetuate a
system of artistic and expressive “haves” and “have-nots” that chills too
much valuable speech and innovation.
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